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ABSTRACT—Climate change, as the dominant paradigm in natural
resource policy, is obsolete and should be replaced by the water security
paradigm. The climate change paradigm is obsolete because it fails to
adequately resonate with the concerns of the general public and fails to
integrate fundamental sustainability challenges related to economic
development and population growth. The water security paradigm directly
addresses the main reasons climate change ultimately matters to most
people—droughts, floods, plagues, and wars. Additionally, this new
proposed paradigm better integrates climate change concerns with other
pressing global sustainability challenges—including that economic
development and population growth will require 50% more food and
energy and 30% more water by 2030 regardless of climate change. The
water security paradigm orients all natural resource policies toward
achieving a sustainable quantity and quality of water at acceptable costs
and risks. Water security improves upon the climate change paradigm in
several ways: it (1) replaces carbon footprints with water footprints as the
metric for sustainability monitoring and reporting, (2) restructures natural
resource governance at the watershed level with regional, rather than
hierarchical, leadership, (3) integrates security and public health concerns
into natural resource policies, (4) encourages investment in infrastructure
for drought and flood resilience, and (5) facilitates the sustainable
implementation of human rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change should be deemphasized in law and policy. Not
because the science behind climate change is bad (it is not)1 and not
because climate change is not important (it is).2 Climate change should be

1 See Sheila Jasanoff, Serviceable Truths: Science for Action in Law and Policy, 93 TEX. L. REV.
1723, 1741 (2015) (noting the scientific “consensus on the anthropogenic origins of climate change and
some of the dire implications of unchecked global-mean-temperature rise”); see also Naomi Oreskes,
The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCI. 1686 (2004) (summarizing the prevailing
scientific consensus surrounding the causes and implications of global climate change). For a detailed
discussion of climate change science and background on how anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions
impact global climate patterns, see generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001).
2 Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law,
115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1493 (2006) (including “climate change” in a list of “critical issues” that national
governments alone struggle to address); Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 907 (2011)
(stressing the “importan[ce]” of “[i]ssues like climate change”); Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman,
Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1531 (2009) (“This Essay shows that
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deemphasized and indeed replaced as a policy paradigm because it is
incomplete and ineffective. 3 Instead, the new paradigm for natural resource
law and policy should be centered on water security, a paradigm that avoids
the limitations and inadequacies of the dominant climate change discourse. 4
The climate change paradigm is inadequate for three reasons. First,
climate change does not sufficiently resonate with the general public. 5 Even
the phrase climate change evokes leaves changing colors in the fall and
flowers blooming in the spring; global warming evokes long summer days.
Talk of rising sea levels sounds only like the promise of living closer to the
beach. To the average person, a problem framed in terms of a few degrees
Celsius or a few feet of sea level rise does not sound very serious, and a
problem framed in terms of ice caps or polar bears does not sound very
relevant.6 Furthermore, carbon footprints and greenhouse gas emissions are
performance metrics so unfamiliar to most people that they struggle to
assess both the severity of the problem and the likelihood of success of
proposed solutions. 7 Efforts to make climate change more accessible have
been moderately successful, 8 and the climate change paradigm has

the United States has reason to take prompt and aggressive action to address climate change, not out of
benevolence or guilt, but out of self-interest.”).
3 Cf. Orr Karassin, Mind the Gap: Knowledge and Need in Regulating Adaptation to Climate
Change, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 383 (2010) (noting that existing regulatory approaches to
climate change adaptation incompletely address long-term sustainability challenges); John D. Sterman
& Linda Booth Sweeney, Understanding Public Complacency About Climate Change: Adults’ Mental
Models of Climate Change Violate Conservation of Matter, 80 CLIMATIC CHANGE 213, 235–36 (2007)
(documenting prevalent misunderstandings of basic climate science among science-educated subjects
and discussing how public discourse regarding climate change has been ineffective in generating public
support for climate change mitigation and adaptation policies).
4 See, e.g., Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Does
Chevron Set the EPA Free?, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 319 (2010) (providing an example and critique
of the dominant approach to climate change mitigation—through regulatory measures aimed at
reducing greenhouse gas emissions).
5 See Sarah E. Light, Valuing National Security: Climate Change, the Military, and Society,
61 UCLA L. REV. 1772, 1788–89 (2014) (proposing that reframing climate change discourse in terms
of national security may improve the resonance of climate discourse with certain segments of the
public, as compared to framing the discourse in terms of environmental and sustainability concerns);
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 507 (2007) (“Climate change generally does not trigger strong emotions, and
people are willing to consider whether significant harm is probable.”).
6
See Anthony A. Leiserowitz, American Risk Perceptions: Is Climate Change Dangerous?,
25 RISK ANALYSIS 1433, 1438 (2005) (finding that, among those tested, climate change was most
commonly associated with images of “melting glaciers and polar ice,” and that “[Americans] think the
impacts [of climate change] will mostly affect people and places that are geographically and temporally
distant”).
7 See infra Section I.C.
8 See generally Tien Ming Lee et al., Predictors of Public Climate Change Awareness and Risk
Perception Around the World, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1014, 1014–20 (2015) (discussing the
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advanced important goals of sustainability and resiliency. 9 But much more
is necessary to broadly engage and educate people regarding the impacts
and importance of adapting to changing global climate patterns. 10
Relatedly, the phrase climate change has become so politically
charged as to become a liability in advancing sustainable natural resource
policies, particularly in light of the election of Donald Trump as President
of the United States and demonstrated by his announcement that the United
States will withdraw from the Paris Accords addressing climate change
mitigation. 11 Climate change, as a policy brand, has become so politicized
as to frequently paralyze discourse on sustainability. Something that should
be as controversial as carrying an umbrella when the forecast is rainy has
somehow become a new third rail that is rarely discussed in political
discourse. Trump’s election has strengthened the political position of
climate change deniers and put those who do not highly prioritize climate
change mitigation and adaptation in positions of influence over federal
natural resource policies. 12 If the aims of the sustainable natural resource
policy agenda are to be advanced in the new administration, then scholars,
activists, and policy entrepreneurs may find it necessary to talk about
climate change without saying climate change.
The second reason the climate change paradigm is inadequate is
because it is incomplete. Climate change is not the most pressing natural
resource problem. The most pressing problem is that, by 2030, global
population growth and economic development will increase demand for
food and energy by 50% and for freshwater by 30%, whether or not the
results of a survey of 119 countries to identify predictors and effective messages for conveying the risks
of global climate change).
9 See, e.g., Carol E. Lee & William Mauldin, U.S., China Agree on Implementing Paris Climate
Change Pact; Obama, Xi Seek to Demonstrate Accord Between Developed and Developing Nations,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-agree-on-implementing-parisclimate-change-pact-1472896645 [https://perma.cc/DC29-K7X9]. The U.N. Convention on Climate
Change and its associated Kyoto Protocol and recent Paris Accords are admirable advances in
international cooperation in addressing climate change.
10 Albert C. Lin, Evangelizing Climate Change, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1135, 1139 (2009).
11 For a general discussion of the politically controversial nature of climate change, see generally
Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 1295 (2009). See also Clare Foran,
Donald Trump and the Triumph of Climate-Change Denial, ATLANTIC (Dec. 25, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/donald-trump-climate-change-skepticdenial/510359/ [https://perma.cc/S6LH-9CLU]; Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from
Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/
trump-paris-climate-agreement.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/4PY3-J8KC] .
12 Foran, supra note 11; see also Ben Wolfgang, Republican Attorneys General Eager to Dismantle
Obama Climate Change Agenda Under Donald Trump, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2016),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/dec/26/republican-attorneys-general-eager-to-dismantleob/ [https://perma.cc/8VLM-SSCC] (detailing the efforts of Republican attorneys general to eliminate
regulations based on climate change concerns).
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climate continues to change. 13 Global consumption of natural resources is
“unsustainable,” 14 and climate change makes this pressing problem worse. 15
While climate change is an aggravating factor in the challenge of natural
resource management, 16 the current climate change paradigm results in
narrowly defining “sustainable” or “green” behaviors as those that have a
low carbon footprint without factoring in the myriad ways such behaviors
might be otherwise harmful. 17
Third, the deficiencies of the climate change paradigm have arisen
because it is being led by the wrong people. The early development of the
climate change paradigm was largely hierarchical, meaning its trajectory
was set by a top-down, national and supranational agenda.18 While this
approach made sense at the time given climate change’s global reach, it has
resulted in decisionmaking that is frequently attenuated from the unique
13 See Patricia Wouters et al., Water Security, Hydrosolidarity, and International Law: A River
Runs Through It . . ., 19 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 97, 98 & n.6 (2009) (citing C. McGourty, Global Crisis
‘to Strike by 2030’, BBC NEWS (March 19, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7951838.stm
[https://perma.cc/T36R-PBKS] (quoting Professor John Beddington, U.K. Government Chief Scientist,
who referred to the likely water stress caused by economic development, population growth, and
climate change as the “perfect storm” for a global energy and food crisis)); see also Rhett B. Larson,
Reconciling Energy and Food Security, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 929, 932 n.13 (2014) [hereinafter Larson,
Reconciling Energy].
14 See L. Hunter Lovins, Climate Capitalism: The Business Case for Climate Protection, 27 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 735, 744 (2010) (“[O]n the environment front, as our financial debts have built up, so
have our debts to nature—in terms of the unsustainable depletion of natural resources, measured by the
loss of topsoil, forests, fresh water and biodiversity. Everybody knows that liquidating capital assets to
fuel consumption is crazy but nobody seems to know how to stop it. There is a simple conclusion here:
the self-same abuses of debt-driven ‘casino capitalism’ that have caused the global economy to collapse
are what lie behind the impending collapse of the life-support systems on which we all ultimately
depend.” (quoting Jonathon Porritt, Perfect Storm of Environmental and Economic Collapse Closer
than You Think, GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/mar/23/
jonathon-porritt-recession-climate-crisis [https://perma.cc/LSH6-EBTD])).
15 Wouters et al., supra note 13, at 98.
16 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1175 (2009) (“Addressing climate change
by reducing resource consumption can also be especially difficult to accomplish.”).
17 See Sarah Tran, Expediting Innovation, 36 H ARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 123, 154–55 (2012) (noting
that in the energy-usage context, the adjective “green” is “ubiquitous and implies broadly that
something is ‘environmentally friendly,’ ‘recyclable,’ ‘biodegradable,’ or ‘energy efficient’” (quoting
Roger D. Wynne, Defining “Green”: Toward Regulation of Environmental Marketing Claims, 24 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 785, 786 (1991)); see also infra Section I.C. Nuclear and hydroelectric energy, for
example, have low carbon footprints, but neither is obviously green or sustainable.
18 See William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global
Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 457, 457–58,
496 (2010) (finding that an “Earth systems governance approach to the climate change problem”—one
administered through “a top-down, supra-national regime”—“has become deeply embedded as a basic
objective of climate policy” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Rethinking a
Failing Framework: Adaptation and Institutional Rebirth for the Global Climate Change Regime,
25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 26 (2012).

143

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

local, cultural, economic, and natural conditions of the resources implicated
by climate change. 19 Localized leadership is necessary to take a more
nuanced approach, and improved natural resource management is more
likely to be achieved in a paradigm that focuses on localized resources
rather than a global commons problem like climate change. 20 Our
sustainability challenges should be rebranded in a way that makes sense to
the general public, is adapted to the local and regional conditions and
characteristics of our natural resources, and integrates the human and
environmental impacts of rising food, water, and energy demands with
concerns associated with climate change.
Scientists have long been searching for a unified field theory—one
equation that answers all the questions we have about the physical
universe.21 Natural resource law and policy need a unified sustainability
paradigm—something that integrates all of our sustainability challenges
into one measurable and accessible goal.22 To that end, this Article will
argue that the current narrow and inaccessible climate change paradigm
should be replaced by one that focuses on a more immediate problem:
water security. Water security, as it has been previously defined, is “the
availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water . . . with an
acceptable level of water-related risks.” 23 Framing our policies around
water not only appropriately prioritizes our problems but better integrates
them. Water security directly addresses the reasons climate change matters
to most people—it has exacerbated the threat of droughts, floods,

19 For a general discussion of how more localized approaches to natural resource governance can
facilitate effective response to the challenges of climate change, see generally Hari M. Osofsky, Is
Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 587
(2009) [hereinafter Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?] (arguing for the need to have
“multiscalar legal approaches” to sustainability issues that incorporate greater localized regulation and
engagement).
20 For a discussion of how collaboration among regional and local leadership can lead to improved
natural resource management and sustainable policies, see generally Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day at
the Pool: State Preemption, Common Pool Resources, and Non-Place Based Municipal Collaborations,
36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 445 (2012).
21 See generally BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE (1999) (providing an overview and
history of the pursuit of the unified field theory amongst scientists).
22
See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of
Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1417–18, 1465–67
(1996) (examining the development of environmental law and finding that its current federal regulatory
approach may be in need of evolutionary transformation).
23 David Grey & Claudia W. Sadoff, Sink or Swim? Water Security for Growth and Development,
9 WATER POL’Y 545, 547–48 (2007) (defining “water security” and discussing water security in terms
of anticipated costs and benefits); see also Rhett B. Larson, War and Water, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 7,
2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rhett-b-larson/war-and-water_b_5940892.html
[https://perma.cc/E87M-NSUN] [hereinafter Larson, War and Water].
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displacement, plagues, and wars.24 The water security paradigm would thus
highlight problems and events to which the general public can relate—
droughts in California and Brazil, water protests in Michigan and Ireland,
water conflict in Syria and Kashmir, stagnating economic development in
Ghana, water-related epidemics like cholera in Haiti, and floods in France
and Louisiana.25 That is because water is not just the most important thing. 26
Water is food and energy, war and disease, racial and gender equality, and
immigration and economic development. 27 “[Water] is everything.” 28

24

See Alexandra B. Klass, Renewable Energy and the Public Trust Doctrine, 45 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1021, 1064–65 (2012) (listing increased droughts and floods among the “risks associated with
climate change”). But cf. Jason Scott Johnston, Problems of Equity and Efficiency in the Design of
International Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Schemes, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 407–10 (2009)
(suggesting that, although popular media report that global warming may lead to dire regional
consequences in developing countries, there remains “substantial uncertainty about how much, if at all,
different countries would benefit from present-day reductions in [greenhouse gas] emissions”). Water
insecurity frequently causes or aggravates armed conflict and poverty, leading refugees and immigrants
to flee war and seek opportunity. See Larson, War and Water, supra note 23.
25 Aurelien Breeden & Katarina Johannsen, From Paris to Bavaria, Heavy Rains Cause Deadly
Floods, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/world/europe/francegermany-floods-rain.html [https://perma.cc/NP53-74QT]; Mary M. Chapman, Hundreds in Detroit
Protest over Move to Shut Off Water, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/
19/us/protesters-picket-detroit-over-move-to-shut-off-water.html
[https://perma.cc/56L2-Y9CK];
Suzanne Daley, A New Irish Rebellion, This Time Against Water Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2015)
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/27/world/europe/many-in-ireland-vow-not-to-pay-a-new-watertax.html [https://perma.cc/5CBY-FLJU]; Moses Mozart Dzawu, A Water Crisis Threatens Ghana’s
Economic Growth, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 11, 2013, 6:46 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2013-04-11/a-water-crisis-threatens-ghanas-economic-growth [https://perma.cc/ACC7-F33N];
Joshua Hammer, Is a Lack of Water to Blame for the Conflict in Syria?, S MITHSONIAN MAG. (June
2013),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/is-a-lack-of-water-to-blame-for-the-conflict-insyria-72513729/ [http://perma.cc/ST8F-ZAHQ]; Jenny Jarvie, Historic Flooding Kills 8 in Louisiana as
Thousands Scramble for Safety, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016, 8:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/nationnow/la-na-louisiana-flooding-20160815-snap-story.html [http://perma.cc/98VE-44WG];
Niharika Mandhana, Water Wars: Why India and Pakistan are Squaring Off over Their Rivers, TIME
(Apr.
16,
2012),
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2111601,00.html
[http://perma.cc/U7BE-GRWH]; Adam Nagourney et al., California Drought Tests History of Endless
Growth, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/us/california-drought-testshistory-of-endless-growth.html?mcubz=0 [http://perma.cc/R56W-3CUX]; Renaud Piarroux, The U.N.’s
Responsibility in Haiti’s Cholera Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/09/08/opinion/the-uns-responsibility-in-haitis-cholera-crisis.html?mcubz=0
[http://perma.cc/6X2X-NSRZ]; Kenneth Rapoza, Brazil’s Biggest Drought in Decades Also Worsens
Interest Rate Outlook, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2014, 8:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
kenrapoza/2014/03/25/brazils-biggest-drought-in-decades-also-worsens-interest-rate-outlook/
[https://perma.cc/R7WR-FH3T].
26 See Rhett B. Larson, The New Right in Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2187 (2013)
[hereinafter Larson, The New Right].
27 See generally Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13 (discussing how water security
integrates concerns surrounding food and energy production and transmission); Inga T. Winkler et al.,
Treasuring What We Measure and Measuring What We Treasure: Post-2015 Monitoring for the
Promotion of Equality in the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Sector, 32 WIS. INT’L L.J. 547 (2014)
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes and evaluates the
shifting dominant paradigms in natural resource law and policy up to the
most recent: the climate change paradigm. The climate change paradigm
has made important progress in addressing a critical issue, but its
inaccessibility and incompleteness—partially driven by its top-down
leadership—renders it inadequate and ripe for replacement. That
incompleteness is partly due to the limitations of a “hierarchist”-led
movement. These movements are characterized by decisionmakers who are
remote from and unfamiliar with unique local conditions and, thus, less
informed about the impact of their interventions on communities.
Part II defines the water security paradigm and explains why it should
replace the climate change paradigm. The water security paradigm
responds to the two fundamental limitations of the climate change
paradigm—its inaccessibility and lack of resonance with the general public
and its failure to address rising food, water, and energy demands that exist
independent of climate change. The new paradigm is labeled water security
to explicitly engage with the ongoing dialogue regarding both food and
energy security and to elevate water to the prime consideration in this
dialogue.29 The water security paradigm focuses on the issues most
accessible and relevant to the general public in part by replacing the carbon
emissions regime with the more integrated and understandable water
footprint, including “virtual water.” Virtual water is the water embedded in
all products.30 As such, water footprint reporting that accounts for virtual
water would give a more accurate and integrated picture of sustainability
than mere carbon footprint reporting. 31 Part II also describes how the water
security paradigm could affect governance structures. In particular,
wherever possible, jurisdictional boundaries should be drawn to correspond
to the watershed by interjurisdictional agreements to encourage cost

(noting the disproportionate burden water insecurity has on women and girls and on racial and ethnic
minorities).
28 Jacinta Ruru, The Right to Water as the Right to Identity: Legal Struggles of Indigenous Peoples
of Aotearoa New Zealand, in THE RIGHT TO WATER 110, 110 (Farhana Sultana & Alex Loftus eds.,
2012).
29 In a previous article, I described the concept of water security as a policy paradigm and situated
that paradigm within a broader discussion of security in food and energy policy. The discussion of
water security in Part II of this Article draws largely from the ideas developed in that article. See
Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13.
30 See J.A. (Tony) Allan, Virtual Water - the Water, Food, and Trade Nexus: Useful Concept or
Misleading Metaphor?, 28 WATER INT’L 4, 5 (2003) [hereinafter Allan, Virtual Water] (defining virtual
water as “the water needed to produce agricultural commodities” but acknowledging that “[t]he concept
could be expanded to include the water needed to produce non-agricultural commodities” as well).
31 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 952–55.
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internalization and lower transaction costs. 32 Because of this more localized
approach, the water security paradigm should be led by embedded norm
entrepreneurs at the basin level—what this Article calls “regionalists.”
Part III proposes three reforms in environmental and natural resource
law that will advance the water security paradigm and explains why
successful implementation of those reforms is more likely under a water
security paradigm than a climate change paradigm. First, nations should
recognize a sustainable human right to water. Many nations currently
recognize a human right to water but implement it in a way that is neither
economically nor ecologically sustainable. 33 A sustainable human right to
water facilitates public participation in water resource planning, encourages
full cost recovery and water conservation through cost internalization, and
promotes transparency and investment in water utilities infrastructure. 34
Second, water law has historically focused primarily on what this
Article refers to as the “Green Agenda” (water quality) and the “Blue
Agenda” (water supply), often to the exclusion or detriment of the “Red
Agenda” (control of pathogens and disease vectors, such as mosquitoes).35
The water crisis in Flint, Michigan, illustrates one way in which the Blue
Agenda (seeking a cheaper water source from the Flint River) conflicted
with the Green Agenda (high chloride concentrations in raw water leaching
lead out of an outdated infrastructure) and the Red Agenda (outbreaks of
Legionnaires’ Disease).36 Water law should be reformed to better integrate
the Red Agenda. 37 Approvals of water projects like dams and irrigation
systems should include mandatory assessments of the impact of water
infrastructure projects on disease vector habitat.38 Third and finally, legal
reforms that facilitate investment in innovative water augmentation and
conservation technologies, such as desalination, and investment in water
infrastructure to increase drought and flood resiliency, such as dams and
reservoirs, should be implemented. Ultimately, the greatest challenge of
32
I described the importance of river-basin-level governance for water resources in a previous
article. The discussion in Part II on basin-level governance draws largely from the ideas developed in
that article. See generally Rhett B. Larson, Interstitial Federalism, 62 UCLA L. REV. 908 (2015)
[hereinafter Larson, Interstitial Federalism].
33 See Rhett B. Larson, Adapting Human Rights, 26 D UKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2015)
[hereinafter Larson, Adapting Human Rights] (discussing how guaranteeing water provision under a
human rights approach can result in poor cost recovery and limited incentives for conservation).
34 Id.
35 See generally Rhett B. Larson, Law in the Time of Cholera, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1271
(2017) [hereinafter Larson, Time of Cholera] (describing the framework for evaluating the different
water agendas of supply, quality, and public health based on color).
36 Id. at 1299–1300.
37 Id. at 1275–76.
38 Id. at 1311, 1315–17.
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climate change will be increased water variability, 39 and that variability can
be mitigated by advancing water conservation and augmentation
technologies and responsibly developing large dams. The proposed legal
reforms are more likely to be effectively implemented under a new
hydrocentric policy paradigm and will serve both to orient law and policy
toward the aims of water security and to help achieve water security at
local, national, and international levels.
Part IV concludes by discussing the theoretical core of the water
security paradigm, which is based on two related concepts: (1) adaptive
capacity in the law as a means of achieving fairness, and (2) the
abandonment of “normal” in resource management toward an approach of
resilience to extreme conditions. Water security requires laws that adapt to
water reality and produce resilience to water extremes. Part IV also
addresses the promise, and potential limitations and criticisms, of the water
security paradigm, concluding that reframing our natural resource policy
dialogue around water security will lead to improved resource management
and avoid policy stalemates associated with the climate change paradigm.
Water security reframes the discussion for those who do not want to talk
about climate change—without abandoning its essential message—and
simultaneously starts a conversation about sustainability grounded in our
most critical resource.
I.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE PARADIGM

Before reorienting the aims of natural resource law and policy toward
water security, it is essential to first understand the current climate change
paradigm, how it has evolved, and why it no longer suffices to address
sustainability challenges. Section A describes the historical evolution of
natural resource policy paradigms, Section B distinguishes the climate
change paradigm from its predecessor paradigms and argues that climate
change is the current dominant natural resource policy paradigm, and
Section C explains why the climate change paradigm is no longer adequate
and needs to be supplanted.
A. The Evolution of Natural Resource Policy Paradigms
A policy paradigm is a distinct conceptual framework within which
policy decisions are made and justified. 40 A policy paradigm includes
39

Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 951.
See Daniel Béland & Robert Henry Cox, Introduction to Special Issue: The Politics of Policy
Paradigms, 26 GOVERNANCE 193, 193 (2013) (“Policymaking is dominated by paradigmatic thinking—
widely shared ways of thinking about policy challenges that lead to broad consensus about the
appropriateness of a policy response.”); Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the
40
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shared assumptions about problems and solutions, and it is often reinforced
by framing those problems and proposed solutions within the context of
that existing paradigm. 41 Paradigms shift when predominant modes of
thinking are challenged because those modes have proven inadequate or
unsatisfactory. 42 Initially, policymakers resist new paradigms because they
do not fit within the existing paradigm. 43 As the nascent paradigm proves
effective at explaining or solving problems, and better than the old
paradigm at integrating new technologies and information, it gains
acceptance and legitimacy. 44 As paradigms rise and fall, multiple paradigms
may exist simultaneously within the same sphere, 45 but typically one
paradigm predominates. 46 A new paradigm is often characterized and
distinguished by the identity of the policy advocates who develop and rely
on its increasingly accepted framework. 47 Understanding why paradigms
succeed and fail requires an examination of the actors who influenced the
movement. Early advocates not only set the course but are often
State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain, 25 COMP. POL. 275, 279 (1993)
(“[P]olicymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only
the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature
of the problems they are meant to be addressing . . . . I am going to call this interpretive framework a
policy paradigm.”).
41 Michael H. Cohen, A Fixed Star in Health Care Reform: The Emerging Paradigm of Holistic
Healing, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 79, 85 (1995) (discussing the general concept of paradigm shifts while
examining the rising paradigm of holistic healing and the ebbing paradigm of individual systems
diagnostics and treatment in health care approaches).
42 See, e.g., George A. Martínez, Race and Immigration Law: A Paradigm Shift?, 2000 U. I LL. L.
REV. 517, 524 (2000); Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, The Persistent Problem of Obligation in International
Law, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 271, 285–86 (2000).
43 See, e.g., ANATOLE KALETSKY, CAPITALISM 4.0 186 (2010) (noting that “academic
establishments fight hard to resist paradigm shifts”); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS 150–52 (2d ed. 1970) (noting that older scientists resist paradigm shifts due in part to
professional investments in existing paradigms).
44 See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, The Plight of the Secular Paradigm, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1409,
1418 (2013) (describing how a paradigm that persistently fails to “address[] anomalies and puzzles”
may be “discarded in favor of a new one that” better “account[s] for all the evidence”).
45 See, e.g., Stephen A. Conrad, The Rhetorical Constitution of “Civil Society” at the Founding:
One Lawyer’s Anxious Vision, 72 IND. L.J. 335, 347–48 (1997) (noting one scholar’s “emphasis on
multiple, simultaneous, or chronologically overlapping paradigms of society” in the eighteenth
century).
46
See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1241 (1982) (acknowledging that “[i]n many studies . . . a single paradigm is
seen to dominate an entire discipline for a lengthy period, only to be succeeded by another dominant
paradigm following a revolutionary struggle” but ultimately finding a different pattern in which “a
number of conflicting remedial paradigms coexist over a considerable period of time”).
47 See J. A. Allan, Water in the Environment/Socio-Economic Development Discourse:
Sustainability, Changing Management Paradigms and Policy Responses in a Global System, 40 GOV’T
& OPPOSITION 181, 193–95 (2005) [hereinafter Allan, Water in the Environment] (identifying each of
five water management paradigms with the sector of society that chiefly participates in that paradigm).
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disproportionately influential in outlining the goals of a paradigm’s policies
and defining success. 48 Some policy paradigms are hierarchical, in that they
are top-down and driven by high-level government leadership at the
national or even supranational governmental level. Borrowing Professor
Allan’s term, I call these leaders hierarchists. 49 Other policy paradigms are
bottom-up initiatives, characterized as civil movements and distinguished
by the leadership of ethicists concerned primarily with social justice. 50
Some policy paradigms are led by entrepreneurs in the private for-profit
sector and focus on wealth maximization and efficiency. 51 Of course, it is
possible that multiple stakeholders lead the paradigm, in that ethicists,
entrepreneurs, and hierarchists all work together. 52 Still, it can be helpful to
look to the earliest advocates of a particular paradigm as a means of
categorizing paradigms and examining how their earliest advocates
influence the trajectory of a paradigm’s development. 53

48 John W. Lee & W. Eugene Seago, Policy Entrepreneurship, Public Choice, and Symbolic
Reform Analysis of Section 198, the Brownfields Tax Incentive: Carrot or Stick or Just Never Mind?,
26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 613, 639 (2002) (“Policy entrepreneurs adopt policy
proposals in order to promote their own interests, gain favors and obligations for future bargaining . . .
or just because they personally favor those particular policies as a matter of ideology or otherwise.”).
49 See Allan, Water in the Environment, supra note 47, at 193–95.
50 See, e.g., JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR O UR TIME
(2005) (discussing the civil movements aimed at economic development and social justice for
disadvantaged communities, with particular emphasis on the United Nations Millennium Development
Goals); Allan, Water in the Environment, supra note 47, at 193–95.
51 See, e.g., Allan, Water in the Environment, supra note 47; see also Yochai Benkler, Commons
and Growth: The Essential Role of Open Commons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499
(2013) (reviewing BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE (2012) (noting the ongoing debate over
the role of private sector leadership in shifting paradigms regarding management of shared resources));
Muthukumara Mani & Shreyasi Jha, Trade Liberalization and the Environment in Vietnam 2 (World
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3879, 2006) (noting the role of entrepreneurs and the forprofit sector in shifting paradigms to trade liberalization in Vietnam).
52 See, e.g., David J. Bederman, An Evaluation of the Contribution of the Conference, 22 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 201, 202 (2008) (noting the tension created by the simultaneous roles of both top-down
and bottom-up leadership in the formulation of international law, particularly in the context of public
health).
53 See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,”
99 YALE L.J. 251, 274–77 (1989) (noting the role of changing leadership in universities in the
development of the academic freedom paradigm in higher education); Allen N. Sultan, Principal and
Practical Foundations of a Global Constitutional Order, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 155, 161–
62 (2004) (noting the role of early leaders’ “moral courage” in setting a trajectory for paradigms in
constitutional law).
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1. The Industrial Paradigm
The earliest broad frameworks for the management of natural
resources emerged from the Industrial Revolution.54 The industrial
paradigm was characterized by the leadership of entrepreneurs and driven
by a reliance on market incentives. 55 These incentives encouraged the
development of natural resources and improved efficiencies in natural
resource exploitation and in technological innovation but also led to many
instances of the tragedy of the commons and negative externalities. 56 The
industrial paradigm is characterized by the leadership of entrepreneurs,
such as John D. Rockefeller, who spurred economic development and
technological innovation but at a heavy price of resource contamination
and depletion. 57
In the context of water law and policy, the era of the industrial
paradigm is characterized by the “hydraulic mission” whose hallmark is the
subjugation and exploitation of water in pursuit of political legitimacy and
economic development. 58 The hydraulic mission was driven by “the strong
conviction that every drop of water flowing to the ocean is a waste and that
the state should develop hydraulic infrastructure to capture as much water
as possible for human uses.”59 Water was dammed and polluted in pursuit
of economic development, and it was treated as a commodity with
economic, but not necessarily inherent, value. 60 Furthermore, water was a

54 Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Where Did All the Blue Skies Go? Sustainability
and Equity: The New Paradigm, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 399, 410 (1994) (providing an overview of the
values of the industrial paradigm).
55 See generally THOMAS C. COCHRAN, FRONTIERS OF CHANGE (1981) (providing a comparative
history of the early Industrial Revolution in the U.S. and Europe and noting the role of entrepreneurs
and financiers in shaping that era).
56 See Collin & Collin, supra note 54, at 408–11.
57 See Itzchak E. Kornfeld, Cleaning Up Superfund: A Proposal for Permanent Cleanups and
Returning Land Back to Nature—With Applications to the Petroleum Industry, 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 335, 357–58 (1994) (detailing case studies demonstrating the public health, economic, and
environmental impacts of resource exploitation in the oil and gas industry).
58 See Jeremy Allouche, The Multi-Level Governance of Water and State-Building Processes: A
Longue Durée Perspective, in THE POLITICS OF WATER: A S URVEY 45, 58–59 (Kai Wegerich & Jeroen
Warner eds., 1st ed. 2010) (defining the “hydraulic mission” as “an attempt to control and manipulate
water resources of a country so that its constituents may meet their domestic, industrial and agricultural
needs”); see also Kate Darling, A Weight for Water: An Ecological Feminist Critique of Emerging
Norms and Trends in Global Water Governance, 13 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 368, 378 (2012)
(discussing Allouche, supra); Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A
New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV.
109, 151–54 (1995) [hereinafter Wood, Protecting the Attributes].
59 Philippus Wester et al., The Hydraulic Mission and the Mexican Hydrocracy: Regulating and
Reforming the Flows of Water and Power, 2 WATER ALTERNATIVES 394, 396 (2009).
60 Darling, supra note 58, at 378.
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symbol of political legitimacy, 61 with operation of large water infrastructure
perceived as essential to and demonstrative of political power: large dams,
for example, stood as symbols of a regime’s strength and beneficence. 62 As
with any paradigm, the earliest advocates set the trajectory of the hydraulic
mission and defined what success meant. 63 Much like the industrial
paradigm broadly, 64 this trajectory was one of resource development and
exploitation, and leaders sought to wring the maximum amount of
economic value from each drop of water.65
2. The Green Paradigm
The growing challenges of pollution and resource depletion exposed
the industrial paradigm’s failure to integrate consideration of these
externalities.66 The industrial paradigm was ultimately challenged and
supplanted by what I term the “green paradigm,” 67 which focused on
broadly limiting environmental damage through a system of “direct
regulatory proscription.” 68 The green paradigm also introduced other
specific mechanisms for internalizing costs that were previously
externalized; these include the permitting requirements of the Clean Water
Act and Clean Air Act and the “polluter pays” principle of Superfund.69
Additionally, the green paradigm saw the enactment of significant pieces of

61

See id.
Allouche, supra note 58, at 58–59; see also Wester et al., supra note 59, at 397–400 (detailing
how Mexico’s Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Revolutionary Institutional Party) consolidated
power in the twentieth century through water infrastructure development as an example of the hydraulic
mission).
63 François Molle et al., Hydraulic Bureaucracies and the Hydraulic Mission: Flows of Water,
Flows of Power, 2 WATER ALTERNATIVES 328, 329–31 (2009) (describing political regimes throughout
the world that relied on the ethos of the hydraulic mission to gain and secure power).
64 See Wood, Protecting the Attributes, supra note 58, at 152–56 (describing the “industrial
development model” as one of two main economic paradigms in modern Indian Country and noting its
focus on resource exploitation which has been to the long-term detriment of many tribes).
65 Molle et al., supra note 63, at 332.
66 See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115,
149–50 (2004) (noting the aims of environmental law were in part to internalize externalities of
industrial-scale pollution); Wyatt G. Sassman, Environmental Justice as Civil Rights, 18 RICH. J.L. &
P UB. INT. 441, 456 (2015) (noting the role of environmental law in internalizing the costs of the
industrial economy).
67
See generally GREEN PARADIGMS AND THE LAW (Nicole Rodgers ed., 1998) (providing, through
a series of chapters, an overview and discussion of the “green paradigm” as an evolving set of norms
and aims associated with environmental protection and resource sustainability).
68 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Framing Rules: Breaking the Information Bottleneck, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 75, 75–77 (2008).
69 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.
(2012); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or
Superfund), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (2012).
62
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environmental protection legislation, 70 and it encouraged greater
transparency in natural resource management. Examples of this include
environmental impact assessments under the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA) and the listing and consultation requirements under
the Endangered Species Act (ESA).71
The green paradigm was marked by the leadership of ethicists, 72 or
nongovernmental actors, and by grassroots advocacy led by individuals
such as Rachel Carson and Lois Gibbs. 73 Beyond legislative reforms, the
green paradigm led to Earth Day, a marked increase in “press coverage of
the environment,” and generally broader awareness of human impacts on
the environment.74 Ethicists set the green paradigm on a trajectory favoring
bottom-up advocacy for interventions focused on the prevention of
environmental harms and for a broader and stronger public “environmental
ethos.”75

70 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 256, 301 (2010); see also Jim Chen, Legal Mythmaking in a Time of Mass Extinctions:
Reconciling Stories of Origins with Human Destiny, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 292 (2005) (placing
the Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act within the category of “‘superstatutes’ whose ‘institutional [and] normative’ impact reaches issues ordinarily addressed through
constitutional law” (citing William Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215,
1216 (2001) [hereinafter Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes]); Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super Statutes,
supra, at 1242–46 (describing the scope and significance of the Endangered Species Act in particular).
71 See Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2012); National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (2012); Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the
Environmental Right to Know, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1015–16 (2012) (discussing the NEPA
requirements).
72 Cf., e.g., Roesler, supra note 71 (identifying the fundamental interests that underlie the right to
demand disclosure of environmental information, including intellectual freedom, personal liberty, selfgovernment, and human health).
73 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 683, 691–99 (1999) (describing the ultimately exaggerated public response to the 1976 Love
Canal overflow, the “key role” that local resident Lois Marie Gibbs “played . . . in reinforcing fears of
adverse health effects [from the overflow] and mobilizing public attention,” and the resulting passage of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)); see, e.g.,
RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); Roesler, supra note 71 (example of the incorporation of
ethical considerations in environmental law illustrating the role of ethicists).
74 See Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the
Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 94–95 (2001).
75 See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines:
Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q.
53, 83 (2010) (discussing the “expansion of public trust concepts to the environment” as an
improvement on regulatory law because a public trust is “more comprehensive in its considerations,”
and noting one scholar’s description of the public trust doctrine as “the most compelling beacon for a
fundamental and rapid paradigm shift towards sustainability” (quoting Mary Christina Wood,
Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future
Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 45
(2009) [hereinafter Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust])).
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However, the green paradigm failed to account fully for the growing
threat of global climate change and did not adequately address concerns of
intergenerational equity. 76 For example, the green agenda’s focus on
pollution prevention and remediation aimed to achieve acceptable resource
quality for the current generation but not necessarily resource sustainability
for future generations. 77 Furthermore, the green paradigm’s aims were
diffuse and lacked integration, with efforts to address air pollution,
hazardous waste, clean water, and endangered species embodied in
independent regulatory schemes. 78 What was needed, then, was a new
paradigm that found ways to connect the disjointed aspects of the green
movement and raise the priority of climate change adaptation and
mitigation relative to these other environmental concerns.
B. Climate Change as the Dominant Natural Resource Policy Paradigm
The climate change paradigm followed the green paradigm and has
been a direct response to the green paradigm’s limitations. Climate change
is about more than just the impacts of changing climate patterns brought on
by anthropogenic greenhouse gases: it is a paradigm aimed at integrating
environmental protection with sustainable resource management. 79 This
paradigm is distinct from the green paradigm in many ways, particularly in
its focus on adaptation and resiliency rather than establishing minimum
standards of environmental quality. 80 The climate change paradigm

76 But see Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust, supra note 75, at 46 (“Society is exhausting lifesustaining natural resources at a pace that threatens the lives, comfort, and economic prosperity of
individuals—not just future generations, but those living on Earth today.”); cf. Alice Kaswan, Greening
the Grid and Climate Justice, 39 ENVTL. L. 1143, 1158–59 (2009) (predicting political opposition to the
“green movement” in the case that it fails to “address social justice” concerns).
77 See Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust, supra note 75, at 54–55, 67–71 (advocating that, in
the environmental context, the government function “as [t]rustee of [p]ublic [a]ssets for [p]resent and
[f]uture [g]enerations,” and contrasting this public trust model with “the [f]ailed [p]aradigm of
[e]nvironmental [l]aw” and its bloated “administrative state”).
78 See Scott M. Davidson, On Environmental Thought at the Turn of the Century, 42 N AT.
RESOURCES J. 433, 438 (2002) (reviewing JOHN MARTIN GILLROY, J USTICE & NATURE: KANTIAN
PHILOSOPHY, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE LAW (2000) (noting “the division of environmental
regulation according to environmental media” with specific reference to air pollution (Clean Air Act)
and water pollution (Clean Water Act))).
79 See, e.g., Anika E. Leerssen, Smart Growth and Green Building: An Effective Partnership to
Significantly Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 26 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 287, 301–02 (2011) (noting,
in the last decade, the emergence in federal policymaking of “smart growth” efforts “to reduce GHG
[(greenhouse gas)] emissions in the U.S. transportation sector through integration of land use and
transportation planning”).
80 See generally Carlarne, supra note 18 (discussing the need for integrating adaptive management
principles as part of climate change policy); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural
Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 367–70, 391–92 (2010) (discussing the
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attempts to integrate broader concerns for intergenerational equity
(sustainable resource management) with concerns of intragenerational
equity (the disparate impacts that environmental contamination and
resource depletion have on developing countries and economically
disadvantaged communities).81 Climate change also prioritizes natural
resource policies that promote both adaptation or resilience to changing
climate patterns and mitigation of those impacts through the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions. 82 Currently, policymakers frequently rely on
carbon footprints to integrate these concerns. 83 Carbon footprints, as a
metric and policy tool, potentially integrate concerns of resource
overexploitation, income inequities in resource allocation, deforestation,
and sustainable development. 84
The climate change paradigm is led by hierarchists at the national or
supranational level. 85 Climate change is a problem of planetary scope,
involving the entire atmosphere, oceans, mountains, forests, energy and
food.86 In that light, climate change regulation is effectively the regulation
of the global commons, and thus the paradigm’s leaders saw a cooperative
international framework as the ideal approach. 87 Such an approach arguably
often-competing mitigation and adaptation policy approaches in environmental law and stating the need
for increased focus on adaptation).
81 See EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 117, 345 (1989) (quoting
Edith Brown Weiss, Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity and International Law: An Introductory
Note, 15 Climatic Change 327, 327 (1989)) (on intergenerational equity); Victor B. Flatt, Adapting
Laws for a Changing World: A Systemic Approach to Climate Change Adaptation, 64 FLA. L. REV.
269, 289–91 (2012) (on intragenerational equity).
82 Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead” — Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for
Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 43–44 (2010).
83 Alessandro Galli et al., Integrating Ecological, Carbon and Water Footprint into a “Footprint
Family” of Indicators: Definition and Role in Tracking Human Pressure on the Planet,
16 ECOLOGICAL INDICATORS 100, 102 (2012) (“The Carbon Footprint measures the total amount of
GHG emissions that are directly and indirectly caused by an activity or are accumulated over the life
stages of a product.”); see also Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A. Cohen, Climate Change
Governance: Boundaries and Leakage, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 221, 224–25 (2010) (noting the use of
the carbon footprint metric in establishing a threshold over which facilities must report carbon
emissions).
84 See, e.g., Jody M. Endres, Agriculture at a Crossroads: Energy Biomass Standards and a New
Sustainability Paradigm?, 2011 U. I LL. L. REV. 503, 530 (2011) (discussing how various agencies use
the carbon footprint metric in the agricultural context); Galli et al., supra note 83, at 101–02 (discussing
the importance of the carbon footprint as it relates to overall ecosystem sustainability).
85 See Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for
Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 671–74 (2010) (“It is not surprising
that scholars are skeptical of local governments’ ability to contribute meaningfully to greenhouse gas
reductions. The very nature of climate change seems to render it incompatible with local control.”).
86 Eric W. Orts, Climate Contracts, 29 V A. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 199–202 (2011).
87 See Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The
Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 187–88 (2005) (“With respect to global environmental
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requires a hierarchical, top-down approach within a supranational
organization.88 Thus, given the sheer geographic scope of the challenge of
mitigating anthropogenic climate change, and the inevitable spillover
effects of greenhouse gas emissions, the movement began with intervention
by the United Nations to cooperatively address climate change through an
international framework convention. 89 Unsurprisingly, given these global
beginnings, the climate change paradigm pursues policies that embrace
broader considerations than the green paradigm—including energy
consumption and the differentiated responsibilities of developed nations
compared to developing nations regarding resource protection. 90
Climate change became the dominant paradigm in part because a
hierarchical, integrated approach can spread quickly, penetrating different
industries, levels of government, and policy arenas. It benefited from topdown regulation developed through political and scientific consensus with
broad economic and geographic scope. 91 Given the implications of global
climate change, it arguably should dominate all other natural resource
policy paradigms out of sheer necessity. 92 Its scope and significance
inevitably have resulted in debates about how best to characterize the
paradigm and its goals, including the deployment of descriptive terms or
goals such as sustainability, resilience, or adaptation. 93 The challenges
presented by climate change also include debates regarding issues of
environmental justice, such as the role of human rights in environmental
law and the disproportionate impact climate change has on economically
problems such as global climate change or ozone depletion, the ‘matching principle’ calls for an
international framework or response, as opposed to unilateral subglobal action.”).
88 See id.; see also Daniel Bodansky, International Law and the Design of a Climate Change
Regime, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 201–04 (Urs Luterbacher &
Detlef F. Sprinz eds., 2001) (describing the current model of international cooperation in climate
change law).
89 See generally Daniel Bodansky, A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N.
Climate Change Regime, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 697 (2011) (describing the history behind U.N. efforts to
address climate change).
90 Alexandre Genest, The Fight Against Global Warming: Progress Made and Priorities for a
Successor to the Kyoto Protocol, 46 REVUE J URIDIQUE THÉMIS 525, 574–75 (2012) (describing the
different climate change responsibilities of developed and developing countries).
91 See Suh-Yong Chung, Is the Mediterranean Regional Cooperation Model Applicable to
Northeast Asia?, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 363, 372 (1999) (“Generally, in the environmental
cooperation field, scientific knowledge is critical in terms of defining issues and making policies. Its
increasing role can bring national participation into international environmental cooperation negotiation
efforts.”).
92 See Ross Astoria, Climate Hawks and California’s Carbon Offsets, 28 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
227, 229 (2013) (“Indeed, if we are to avoid catastrophic climate change, global warming policy must
become the dominant form of governmentality.”).
93 See, e.g., Craig, supra note 82 (describing debates over prioritizing adaptation and resiliency
over restoration or preservation).
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and politically marginalized communities. 94 While the debates around these
goals and terms are important, for purposes of this Article, these debates
fall within the broader climate change paradigm originally advocated by
hierarchists, which focuses on responding to the consequences of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Typically, when scholars or
policy advocates speak of resiliency or adaptation or environmental justice
or sustainability, it is against the backdrop of climate change.
While the climate change paradigm has replaced the green paradigm
as the dominant paradigm in environmental and natural resource law and
policy, its dominant position in the scholarly debate has not absolutely
crowded out prior paradigms. 95 Prior paradigms have not disappeared, and
they continue to influence the current climate change paradigm.96 Both the
industrial paradigm and the green paradigm persist and even affect the
climate change paradigm itself. For example, market incentives and private
governance approaches to address greenhouse gas emissions derive from
the industrial paradigm’s entrepreneurial approach. 97 Grassroots advocacy
in climate change, Pigovian carbon taxes, and the view of greenhouse gas
emissions as “pollution” to be regulated under command-and-control
statutes like the Clean Air Act have their roots in the green paradigm.98
94 See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for
International Environmental Rights, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 71, 77 (2005) (“[P]rovid[ing] a starting point
for grappling with the complicated legal intersections at the heart of achieving greater environmental
justice at an international level.”).
95 See, e.g., Carlarne, supra note 18, at 32 (discussing the broad proliferation of scholarship and
policy proposals addressing climate change); Engel & Saleska, supra note 87, at 184–86 (noting the
proliferation of efforts in civil society to address climate change impacts); Stephen M. Gardiner, A
Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption,
15 ENVTL. VALUES 397, 398 (2006) (noting the prominent role of ethical considerations in climate
change discussions).
96 See, e.g., Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean
Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 799, 800–01 (2008) (arguing that key parts of the Clean Air Act—representative of the green
paradigm’s legacy—have continued use in “fill[ing] some of the gaps” that would be left by another
environmental regulatory structure based on “carbon dioxide emission-trading programs”).
97 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate
Change, 3 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 57, 60–62 (2014) (proposing a strengthened transnational, privategovernance response to climate change); David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument:
Dirty Input Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 77–79 (2009) (proposing a new regulatory instrument
relying on market incentives to address greenhouse gas emissions).
98 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: Why a
Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 6–7
(2009) (proposing a carbon tax); Shalanda H. Baker, Climate Change and International Economic Law,
43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 73–74 (2016) (discussing environmental grassroots activists in El Salvador);
Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by
Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 643
(2008) (referring to greenhouse gas emissions as “pollution”).
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Additionally, it is necessary to point out that the climate change
paradigm has not been entirely hierarchical. Climate change has a “multiscalar character,” wherein activists, entrepreneurs, and regulators function
at different jurisdictional scales from the local to the supranational. 99 As
larger scale national and supranational jurisdictions leave niches unfilled in
addressing climate change, smaller scale jurisdictions, such as municipal
governments or river-basin commissions, may step in to fill these policy
niches.100 These efforts of state and local governments in the U.S. to
respond to greenhouse gas emissions are examples of nonhierarchical
approaches to climate change. 101 Still, these more localized approaches are
responses to the limitation of the general hierarchical character of the
climate change paradigm because policies are developed and implemented
by those most familiar with the unique geographical and cultural
characteristics of natural resources in a particular region.
Climate change has not necessarily dominated policy discussions at all
levels and in all instances, and vestiges of the green paradigm and
industrial paradigm continue to dictate policy choices. There remain many,
even in positions of influence, who are skeptical of climate change science
and the importance of addressing climate change for future generations. 102
But amongst scholars and advocates within the natural resources and
environmental policy spheres, climate change dominates the discourse,
particularly if one accepts that debates about resiliency, sustainability,
adaptation, and environmental justice are conducted within the context of
climate change.103 The dominance of the climate change paradigm has
facilitated critical advances in environmental and natural resource policy,
including raising public awareness of the threat of global climate change,
99 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the
“Car Deal,” 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 363 (2011) (describing the key stakeholders in the process
of regulating automobile greenhouse gas emissions); Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?,
supra note 19, at 591–93 (describing climate change as a multi-scalar problem).
100 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 926–31 (discussing the role of river-basin
commissions in improving water management).
101 Freeman, supra note 99, at 362 (describing cooperation between the federal government and
California in creating a program for regulating automobile greenhouse gas emissions); see also Garrick
B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 948–51 (2011) (discussing the
roles of local, state, and federal governments in regulating the renewable energy industry).
102 See, e.g., Lyle Scruggs & Salil Benegal, Declining Public Concern About Climate Change: Can
We Blame the Great Recession?, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 505, 505 (2012) (noting a public “‘crisis
of confidence’ in climate science”); John D. Sterman, Communicating Climate Change Risks in a
Skeptical World, 108 CLIMATIC CHANGE 811, 812 (2011) (noting “widespread confusion, complacency
and denial [about climate change] among policymakers, the media and the public”).
103 See Steven Burns, Environmental Policy and Politics: Trends in Public Debate, 23 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 8, 8 (2008) (“Climate change has come to dominate the public discourse on the
environment unlike any other issue today.”).
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reforming laws and regulations to better address anthropogenic greenhouse
gases, increasing investment in adaptation and resiliency, encouraging
greater focus on the disparate impacts of climate change upon the poor, and
driving greater integration of environmental and natural resource issues
under the rubric of carbon footprints and sustainable development. 104
However, as the following Section shows, the climate change paradigm
cannot adequately address many of our more pressing environmental and
natural resource concerns.
C. The Inadequacy of the Climate Change Paradigm
Despite improving on the green paradigm, the climate change
paradigm is nevertheless incomplete, inadequately framed, and ultimately
obsolete. The climate change paradigm fails to adequately address the
primary concern of natural resource policy (increasing global demand for
food, energy, and water) by focusing too much on greenhouse gas
emissions and carbon footprints.105 Despite the strong science underlying
anthropogenic climate change, there have been decades of public debate
about the reality of the threat, its significance, and its salience. 106 The
climate change paradigm has sought to move past this debate through
education or improved messaging. 107 But perhaps it would have been better
to abandon the debate as an expensive drag on progress by recognizing that

104 See Mary Jane Angelo & Joanna Reilly-Brown, Whole-System Agricultural Certification: Using
Lessons Learned from LEED to Build a Resilient Agricultural System to Adapt to Climate Change,
85 U. COLO. L. REV. 689, 694 (2014) (noting the increased emphasis on sustainability in the agriculture
industry); Margaux J. Hall & David C. Weiss, Avoiding Adaptation Apartheid: Climate Change
Adaptation and Human Rights Law, 37 Y ALE J. INT’L L. 309, 336 (2012) (discussing the increased
sensitivity of vulnerable regions and communities to effects of climate change); Douglas A. Kysar,
What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4 (2011) (describing the ways in
which tort law might positively address climate change, but also investigating the potential impact of
climate change on tort law); J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity
in Legal Systems — with Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1373 (2011);
Lisa Schenck, Climate Change “Crisis” – Struggling for Worldwide Collective Action, 19 COLO. J.
INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 319, 346 (2008) (noting that although calls for “more immediate action” are
lacking, “public awareness regarding climate change is increasing”).
105 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 952–53.
106 See generally Riley E. Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright, Organized Climate Change Denial, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY 144–60 (John S. Dryzek et al. eds., 2011)
(discussing partisanship and other causes of ongoing debate over reality, significance, and relative costs
and benefits of climate change and approaches to its mitigation); Dan M. Kahan et al., The Polarizing
Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 732, 732–35 (2012) (discussing the role of science literacy on public engagement in, and
perception of, debates on climate change risks).
107 See, e.g., Karl S. Coplan, Climate Change, Political Truth, and the Marketplace of Ideas,
2012 UTAH L. REV. 545, 573 (2012); Matthew C. Nisbet, Communicating Climate Change: Why
Frames Matter for Public Engagement, 51 ENV’T MAG. 12, 14–23 (2009).
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the central issue in question—anthropogenic climate change—is not in fact
the greatest or most pressing natural resource problem facing humanity.
Indeed, though climate change is enormously important, it is ultimately an
aggravating factor of a more fundamental and proximal concern and one
with far less scientific uncertainty. By 2030, the planet will need 50% more
food and energy and 30% more fresh water, regardless of climate change,
as a result of population growth and increased consumption patterns. 108
Perhaps because it is a hierarchist paradigm, the climate change
paradigm frames the discussion in terms inaccessible to, and remote from,
most people.109 Advocates and scholars regularly assure the general public
that there is a scientific consensus regarding climate change, 110 but their
message is built upon jargon-laden scholarly exchanges regarding complex
mathematical models.111 That consensus is fundamentally about the role of
human sources of greenhouse gas impacts and involves agreements over a
range of possibilities and some inherent and acceptable degree of
uncertainty.112 The message on climate change does not lend itself well to
simple transmission to typical policymakers, voters, and consumers. 113
108 See

supra note 13 and accompanying text.
Brooks E. Harlow & Roy W. Spencer, An Inconvenient Burden of Proof? CO2 Nuisance
Plaintiffs Will Face Challenges in Meeting the Daubert Standard, 32 ENERGY L.J. 459, 462 (2011)
(noting the difficulty nonscientists have in understanding the basis for and implications of “the climate
science underpinning the AGW [anthropogenic global warming] theory”); see also Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 905, 954 (2008) (noting how
consumers might have failed to respond to certain market and marketing signals regarding climate
change because “[i]n the last two decades, climate change has been largely a matter of complex,
inaccessible predictions”).
110 Ann Moritz, Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE: A READER 16
(William H. Rodgers Jr. et al. eds., 2011); Coplan, supra note 107, at 553 (identifying and discussing
challenges that the scientific consensus on climate change faces in “achieving acceptance as a political
truth in the marketplace of ideas”); Open letter from Gary W. Yohe et al. (Mar. 12, 2010),
http://e360.yale.edu/assets/site/digest/ipcc-scientists-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/F33B-NCWA].
111 John D. Sterman, Communicating Climate Change Risks in a Skeptical World, 108 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 811, 815–16 (2011).
112 James M. Murphy et al., Quantification of Modelling Uncertainties in a Large Ensemble of
Climate Change Simulations, 430 NATURE 430 (2004) (discussing the challenge of evaluating
uncertainty in global climate models); Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change:
How Do We Know We’re Not Wrong?, in CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT IT MEANS FOR US, O UR
CHILDREN, AND OUR GRANDCHILDREN 65, 69–75 (Joseph F. C. DiMento & Pamela Doughman eds.,
2007).
113
See Caleb W. Christopher, Success by a Thousand Cuts: The Use of Environmental Impact
Assessment in Addressing Climate Change, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 549, 579 (2008); Lawrence C. Hamilton,
Education, Politics and Opinions About Climate Change Evidence for Interaction Effects, 104 CLIMATE
CHANGE 231, 235–42 (2011) (discussing the difficulties of effectively conveying risks of climate
change to voters); Willett Kempton, Lay Perspectives on Global Climate Change, 1 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 183, 183 (1991) (“[G]lobal climate change remains a challenge to lay comprehension. The
scientific issues are staggeringly complex, with major predictions still debated by climatologists.”);
Victoria K. Wells et al., Behaviour and Climate Change: Consumer Perceptions of Responsibility, 27 J.
109
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Attempts to make the research underlying climate change more
accessible often oversimplifies, and the general public is left wondering
how their local weatherman can continually be wrong about the next day’s
weather but thousands of scientists can be so confident about the planet’s
climate in the coming decades and centuries. 114 Even in instances where the
science is adequately conveyed, the relevance and significance is often lost
on the general public. 115 The initial framing of the challenge was often in
terms of “global warming,” but this frame failed to raise concerns for many
people busy shoveling snow from their driveways or for those who may not
be terribly familiar with polar ice caps or glaciers.116 The pitch changed to
“climate change” because global warming did not adequately describe a
problem that was instead about increased extreme climate events and
altered climate patterns.117 Though public awareness and understanding of
climate change causes and impacts have increased since this reframing,
efforts to mobilize both individuals and nations to respond to the threat
have faltered.118 Framing the challenge in terms of either low-probability or
temporally remote catastrophic events arguably generated apathy and
created a wave of skeptics and deniers.119
Moreover, the relatively narrow focus of the climate change paradigm
inevitably fails to fully integrate critical considerations into natural
resource policy decisions. For example, the paradigm’s narrow focus on
carbon emissions neglects the other environmental costs associated with

MARKETING MGMT. 808 (2011) (discussing the difficulty in informing consumers about the impacts of
their decisions in climate change mitigation efforts).
114 Maxwell T. Boykoff & Jules M. Boykoff, Climate Change and Journalistic Norms: A CaseStudy of US Mass-Media Coverage, 38 GEOFORUM 1190, 1200–01 (2007).
115 See Graham Frederick Dumas, Note, A Greener Revolution: Using the Right to Food as a
Political Weapon Against Climate Change, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 107, 148 (2010); Alice
Kaswan, Greening the Grid and Climate Justice, 39 ENVTL. L. 1143, 1159 (2009).
116 See DEBIKA SHOME & SABINE MARX, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CLIMATE CHANGE
COMMUNICATION
9
(Andria
Cimino
ed.,
2009),
http://guide.cred.columbia.edu/pdfs/
CREDguide_full-res.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DPA-KEVW].
117 John J. Delaney et al., 2 HANDLING THE LAND USE CASE § 42:1 (3d ed. 2017) (“Often used
interchangeably with ‘global warming,’ the National Academies of Sciences has pointed out that the
phrase ‘climate change’ is growing in preferred use to ‘global warming’ because it helps convey that
there are changes in addition to rising temperatures.”).
118
See Biber, supra note 11, at 1352–54 (noting the high costs, uncertainties, and time periods
associated with any human efforts to adapt to climate change); Marc Limon, Human Rights and Climate
Change: Constructing a Case for Political Action, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 440 (2009) (“[T]here
was a general frustration [leading up to 2005] on the part of vulnerable communities at the slow pace of
progress in tackling climate change using the traditional politico-scientific approach.”).
119 Gary E. Marchant & Karen Bradshaw, The Short-Term Temptations and Long-Term Risks of
Environmental Catastrophism, 56 J URIMETRICS 345, 356–57 (2016).
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new energy sources.120 Developments of nuclear or hydroelectric energy are
low-carbon-emitting energy sources and may be necessary to meet rising
energy demands, but their benefits may not ultimately justify their longterm environmental costs.121 Similarly, solar energy requires extraction of
natural resources like copper, which also may adversely impact the
environment.122 While these new developments may be optimal for longterm climate change, they may have other detrimental environmental
effects.
Additionally, regulators who seek to address climate change may not
adequately consider the effects on the cost of food, water, and energy. For
example, recent federal regulations impose more stringent emissions
standards on coal-fired power plants, 123 and producers may pass associated
compliance costs on to consumers, thereby making energy more expensive.
A critical example of this can be seen in the effect of strengthened
emissions standards on populations that rely on these plants for water. The
Navajo Generating Station (NGS), a coal-fired power plant, provides the
necessary energy to bring Arizona’s allocation of Colorado River water
through to the Central Arizona Project (CAP) canal system and to water
users throughout the state. 124 CAP is critical for delivering water to Native
American tribes in Arizona who have settled their water rights claims to
central Arizona rivers in exchange for the more reliable CAP water.125
Tribes typically pay for the energy costs to transport the water through the
CAP.126 Increased costs from more stringent emissions standards on NGS
could make water provision through CAP unaffordable for some tribes,

120 See Elizabeth Thomas, The Myth of a Single, “Green” Power Resource, 10 N AT. RESOURCES &
ENV’T 65, 65–67 (1996).
121 See Howard A. Latin, Climate Change Mitigation and Decarbonization, 25 V ILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1,
65–66, 69–70 (2014) (listing both hydroelectric and nuclear power as potential “low-GHG replacement
technologies” but also noting the large water needs of nuclear generating facilities); Thomas, supra note
120, at 66–67 (discussing the environmental costs of large dams needed for hydropower projects).
122 Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Authority, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1002, 1004–05, app. at 1065 (1987).
123 See Steven Ferrey, International Power on “Power,” 45 ENVTL. L. 1063, 1084–85, 1085 n.146
(2015).
124 See Scott K. Miller, Undamming Glen Canyon: Lunacy, Rationality, or Prophecy?, 19 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 121, 156 (2000).
125 John B. Weldon, Jr. & Lisa M. McKnight, Future Indian Water Settlements in Arizona: The
Race to the Bottom of the Waterhole?, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 441, 441–42 (2007) (discussing CAP’s role in
tribal water settlements).
126 Id.; see also Ryan Randazzo, 10 Challenges to Keeping the Navajo Generating Station Open,
AZ CENTRAL (May 22, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/energy/2017/
05/22/arizona-10-challenges-keeping-navajo-generating-station-open/332911001/
[https://perma.cc/
3YDH-NUKQ] (noting the potential increased CAP rates due to more stringent emissions controls and
the desire of tribes not to pay an energy premium for water deliveries).
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effectively depriving the tribes of the water rights they agreed to in
settlement.127 Thus, well-intentioned regulators narrowly focused on carbon
emissions may inadvertently make water unaffordable for thousands of
Native Americans in Arizona. 128
Defenders of the climate change paradigm may point to recent
successes in moving the climate change agenda forward, including the
commitments of major greenhouse gas emissions reductions under the Paris
Accords.129 The agreed-upon reductions in the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change in the Conference of the Parties (COP) 21
represent important progress in international cooperation in addressing
climate change and one of the true success stories of the climate change
paradigm.130 Indeed, the climate change paradigm has encouraged
international cooperation to address a pressing global crisis. Nevertheless,
the Paris Accords do not address the short-term natural resource
challenges—the increased demand for water, food, and energy. Natural
resource law and policy must move away from the narrow climate change
paradigm and toward a new approach that integrates the broader and more
pressing concerns of water, food, and energy demands. President Trump’s
announcement regarding the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris
Accords only further illustrates how a focus on the rhetoric of climate
change may create some political obstacles that might be overcome by
simply shifting the dialogue toward a different rhetoric 131—perhaps the
rhetoric of water security.
This Article does not argue that the climate change paradigm is a
failure or that it was unnecessary or counterproductive. Each natural
resource paradigm has made important contributions and likely will endure
127 See Chuck DeVore, The EPA’s All Pain, No Gain Plan to Nationalize the Electric Grid,
FORBES (Mar. 23, 2016, 5:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckdevore/2016/03/23/the-epas-allpain-no-gain-plan-to-nationalize-the-electric-grid/#3fe16aa02813 [https://perma.cc/QTQ7-H6KY].
128 See Abrahm Lustgarten, End of the Miracle Machines: Inside the Power Plant Fueling
America’s Drought, PROP UBLICA (June 16, 2015), https://projects.propublica.org/killing-thecolorado/story/navajo-generating-station-colorado-river-drought
[https://perma.cc/YRT3-XWML]
(“But in pushing for dramatic changes at the Navajo plant, the EPA underestimated how intertwined the
plant had become with every aspect of life in the region — from providing its power to moving its
water to buttressing the tribal economy.”).
129 See Michael Burger et al., Legal Pathways to Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 381–82 (2016) (discussing the success
of the Paris Accords and how the U.S. might implement its commitments under those agreements).
130 Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/climate-change-accord-paris.html
[https://perma.cc/V2KA-57MJ].
131 Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (June
1,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html
[https://perma.cc/9LN3-WUDE].
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as part of the paradigm portfolio of natural resource law and policy in some
form. However, though the climate change paradigm has played an
important role, its limitations have inhibited mobilization. A new paradigm
should now assume primacy in natural resource policy to address those
limitations by integrating climate change concerns with increasing resource
demands in a way that is relatable to the general public.
II. WATER SECURITY: THE RISING PARADIGM
Given the climate change paradigm’s limitations, a new paradigm is
needed, one that is more integrated, accessible, and focused. One not
characterized by the limitations and trajectories of past paradigms set by
hierarchists, entrepreneurs, or ethicists but rather guided by regionalists
who understand the unique characteristics of local watersheds. Water
security should be the new preeminent paradigm in environmental and
natural resource law and policy. Section A defines the water security
paradigm and its scope and importance. Section B next explains why and
how the water security paradigm should supplant the climate change
paradigm, with the more accessible and integrated water footprint metric
replacing the carbon footprint. Section C then describes governance under
the water security paradigm, arguing that the water security paradigm
should be led by regionalists focused on basin-level policy reforms and that
jurisdictional boundaries should be redrawn, to the extent possible, to
correspond to watersheds.
A. Defining the Water Security Paradigm
The water security paradigm reorients the goals of natural resource
and environmental law and policy to achieve “an acceptable quantity and
quality of water” with acceptable costs and risks. 132 Water lies at the heart
of human conflict and cooperation. Water security is the more integrated
and accessible paradigm needed to address the limitations of the climate
change paradigm and move natural resource law and policy forward. A
water-based policy paradigm broadly integrates complex legal issues.
Human civilization arose around desert river basins because survival
in the desert required an unprecedented level of cooperation, specialization,
and investment in public works to develop water resources. 133 The inherent

132 Grey & Sadoff, supra note 23, at 547–48; see also Dan Tarlock & Patricia Wouters, Reframing
the Water Security Dialogue, 20 J. WATER L. 53, 53 (2009) (describing “the increased incidences of
local and regional water problems” as “a global water security problem”).
133 Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiat or Custom: The Checkered Development of International Water Law,
31 Nat. Resources J. 45, 55–60 (1991) (noting that some of the greatest civilizations of antiquity arose
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challenge of developing and sharing a scarce resource like a desert river
gave rise to the first complex political and legal systems to facilitate
collaboration and resolve disputes. 134 Indeed, “the word ‘rival’ [comes]
from the Latin word ‘rivalis,’ meaning persons who live on opposite banks
of a river.” 135 Thus water lies at the heart of human conflict and cooperation
and is, therefore, the foundational element not only of life but also of law.
Given this elementary nature of water, water security underlies
virtually every major societal problem. Drought and floods are obvious
examples. In 2015, thousands of people were killed worldwide in flood
events, with millions of people displaced and damage in the billions of
dollars.136 Drought has plagued countries all over the world, with
particularly disastrous impacts in Brazil, Venezuela, and the southwestern
United States.137 The cost of the historic drought in California for 2015
alone was $2.7 billion. 138
Beyond droughts and floods, many of the major violent conflicts
around the globe have an important and underappreciated water
component.139 It is not a coincidence that the rise of ISIS in Syria or the rise
of the Taliban in Afghanistan occurred during historic droughts in these
countries, which led to mass urbanization and higher food prices. 140

in regions coexistent with drainage basins in arid regions, such as the Indus, Nile, Tigris and Euphrates,
and that early empires were an attempt to impose cooperative frameworks to develop water resources).
134 Id.
135 Joseph W. Dellapenna, International Law’s Lessons for the Law of the Lakes, 40 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 747, 763–64 (2007).
136 See Adam B. Smith & Jessica L. Matthews, Quantifying Uncertainty and Variable Sensitivity
Within the US Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disaster Cost Estimates, 77 NAT. HAZARDS 1829
(2015); Space-based Measurement, Mapping, and Modeling of Surface Water, DARTMOUTH F LOOD
OBSERVATORY, http://floodobservatory.colorado.edu/ (follow the “DFO Flood Archive” hyperlink),
http://floodobservatory.colorado.edu/Archives/MasterListrev.htm [https://perma.cc/8XYC-UXE8].
137 Carrie Kahn & Lulu Garcia-Navarro, Drought Conditions Wreak Havoc on Latin America, NPR
(Aug. 29, 2014, 5:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/08/29/344193332/drought-conditions-wreakhavoc-on-latin-america [https://perma.cc/YZ9X-DKSB]; Michael Martinez & Alexandra Meeks, How
Historic California Drought Affects Rest of Nation, Often for the Worse, CNN (Apr. 3, 2015, 8:39 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/03/us/california-drought/ [https://perma.cc/AQ8U-KJN5].
138 Doyle Rice, California Drought Cost Is $2.7 Billion in 2015, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 2015, 5:51
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2015/08/19/california-drought-cost-27-billion-2015/
32007967/ [https://perma.cc/HL8N-T883].
139 See Larson, War and Water, supra note 23.
140 See David Arnold, Drought Called a Factor in Syria’s Uprising, VOA NEWS (Aug. 20, 2013,
8:19
AM),
http://www.voanews.com/a/drought-called-factor-in-syria-uprising/1733068.html
[https://perma.cc/4UZC-E4XA]; Paula Hanasz, The Politics of Water Security in the Kabul River Basin,
F UTURE DIRECTIONS INT’L (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/thepolitics-of-water-security-in-the-kabul-river-basin/ [https://perma.cc/AN4D-L5JZ]; Justin Worland,
Why Climate Change and Terrorism Are Connected, TIME (Nov. 15, 2015),
http://time.com/4113801/climate-change-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/4L42-5CGE].
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Desperate people in crowded cities without jobs and affordable food are
like dry kindling for the spark of radicalization. 141
Similarly, water security has led to conflict between countries. Indian
dam development on the Indus River has represented one of the most
fraught issues in the ongoing, and sometimes violent, confrontations
between India and Pakistan in the disputed Kashmir region. 142 A battle cry
for some in the region is: “[W]ater must flow, or blood must flow.” 143 The
Six Day War of 1967 between Israel and its Arab neighbors began in part
as a water conflict, with competing attempts to divert the Jordan River
resulting in several Israeli attacks. 144 Even in the United States, water
disputes between states over the Colorado River escalated to the point of a
narrowly avoided civil war.145
Similarly, many of the immigration and refugee challenges
confronting the globe are merely examples of people doing what they have
done for thousands of years: following water. Refugees from the conflict in
Syria are perhaps the most obvious “water refugees” because, as noted
above, the Syrian conflict was precipitated, and partly caused, by a drought
in the Euphrates River basin. 146 But even more fundamentally and broadly,
humans move in search of water security. Modern human migration
patterns reflect moves from water-insecure regions—often exemplified by
limited reservoir storage capacity and thus limited drought and flood
resiliency—to water-secure regions—exemplified by expansive reservoir
capacity and thus high drought and flood resiliency. 147 Even when migrants
141
See Hilal Khashan, The Curse of Underdevelopment and the Radicalization of the Arab City,
17 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 7, 8, 12 (2010) (discussing the role of high food prices and limited economic
opportunities in radicalization).
142 Nicole Livanos, Grab for Water Could Spark Conflict in Pakistan and India, 19 LOY. PUB. INT.
L. REP. 24 (2013); Neal A. Kemkar, Note, Environmental Peacemaking: Ending Conflict Between India
and Pakistan on the Siachen Glacier Through the Creation of a Transboundary Peace Park, 25 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 67, 75 (2006).
143 Unquenchable Thirst, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.economist.com/
node/21538687 [https://perma.cc/4PZV-WJ68].
144 Donald Neff, Israel–Syria: Conflict at the Jordan River, 1949–1967, 23 J. PALESTINE STUD. 26,
35–37 (1994).
145 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 917 (describing how Arizona marched
National Guard troops against California construction crews building the Parker Dam on the Colorado
River when those crews crossed into Arizona’s territory, and how violence was avoided when the U.S.
Secretary of the Interior “halted construction of the dam in exchange for troops being recalled”).
146
John Wendle, Syria’s Climate Refugees, SCI. AM., Mar. 2016, at 50, 52–55. Of course, the
Syrian conflict and resulting refugee crisis cannot adequately be explained by water insecurity alone—
there are a multitude of factors with complex interrelationships. But water insecurity is perhaps the least
obvious, and therefore most underrated, aggravating factor.
147 See Grey & Sadoff, supra note 23, at 551–52, 558–59 (comparing the economic plight of water
insecure countries with the “range of productive opportunities” that water provides in water-secure
countries).
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express their motivations as seeking peace, political stability, or economic
opportunity, those attributes are partly functions of water security. 148
Hydrodiplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico are
connected to immigration issues between the two nations, as limited water
storage capacity in Mexico and salt-contaminated water reaching Mexico
from the United States aggravate economic concerns, thus driving Mexican
northern migration. 149 As climate change causes ocean levels to rise,
flooding and saline intrusion into freshwater aquifers will further aggravate
the already critical global water-refugee crisis.150
Additionally, water security is a critical prerequisite for achieving
racial and gender equality. One of the primary indicators of gender
inequality globally is a lack of educational opportunities for girls and
young women.151 Women and children in developing countries spend up to
six hours each day gathering water, making education and schooling
difficult.152 Further, water provision frequently aggravates racial
inequalities. Water provision, rates, and payment structures in many parts
of the world have been implemented in ways that have disparate racial
impacts.153 For example, in post-apartheid South Africa, the city of
Johannesburg imposed requirements to prepay for water services on
predominantly black communities, such as Phiri, whereas predominantly
white townships could continue to purchase water based on credit. 154
148 See generally Tom I. Romero, II, Bridging the Confluence of Water and Immigration Law,
48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 779 (2016) (evaluating the role of water resource management in Mexican
immigration to the U.S.).
149 See Jonathan S. King et al., Getting to the Right Side of the River: Lessons for Binational
Cooperation on the Road to Minute 319, 18 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 36, 63, 66–67, 82 (2014)
(discussing the history of U.S.–Mexico relations on the Colorado River and the impact of river
management on agriculture and immigration in northern Mexico).
150 Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environmental Law: Integrationist and
Multimodal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 771, 818 (2011) (“Coastal areas will experience
significant sea level rise, but will likely find their groundwater sources of drinking water contaminated
from saltwater intrusion even before large amounts of coastal lands are lost to ocean levels.” (footnote
omitted)).
151 Naila Kabeer, Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: A Critical Analysis of the Third
Millennium Development Goal, 13 GENDER & DEV. 13, 13, 16–18 (2010).
152 See David Hemson, ‘The Toughest of Chores’: Policy and Practice in Children Collecting
Water in South Africa, 5 POL’Y FUTURES IN EDUC. 315, 317, 320 (2007) (reporting that for children in
South Africa, this figure is around six hours per week); Michael R. Ulrich, The Impact of Law on the
Right to Water and Adding Normative Change to the Global Agenda, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 43,
69–70 (2015).
153 See generally Martha F. Davis, Let Justice Roll Down: A Case Study of the Legal Infrastructure
for Water Equality and Affordability, 23 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 355 (2016) (illustrating how
recent drinking water problems in the U.S. reflect racial disparities and in some cases discrimination in
the quality, affordability, and reliability of drinking water provision).
154 Larson, The New Right, supra note 26, at 2253.
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Similarly, the water crisis in Flint, Michigan, has clear racial
implications.155 The majority of the residents of Flint are black, and the
state’s “slow and often antagonistic response” to citizen complaints about
water quality and the city’s reliance on dangerous, outdated infrastructure
to deliver cheaper (and toxic) water, have raised claims of environmental
racism behind the lead-poisoning crisis.156
Water is also a major component of global health and the control of,
and response to, pandemics. 157 The deadly water crisis in Flint, Michigan,
has, in addition to the threats of lead poisoning, included a spike in
Legionnaires’ Disease. 158 The still-ongoing cholera epidemic in Haiti, for
example, had killed over 8,500 people and sickened over 600,000 as of
December 31, 2013.159 It has been estimated that 2.3 billion people live in
areas of “water stress”—defined by a per capita supply of 1,700 cubic
meters per year; “almost 6,000 children under the age of five die every day
from water[-]related diseases.” 160 And, as I wrote previously:
Officials throughout the Western Hemisphere are currently struggling to
contain the growing Zika virus outbreak, spreading by mosquitoes [that breed
in water] and resulting in serious birth defects and death . . . . The serious

155

Shea Diaz, Getting to the Root of Environmental Injustice, GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. (2016),
syndicated on ENVTL. L. REV. SYNDICATE, https://gelr.org/2016/01/29/getting-to-the-root-ofenvironmental-injustice/ [https://perma.cc/PTW9-U5R8] (discussing the environmental justice issues
associated with impacts of natural resource policies on vulnerable communities and racial minorities in
St. Joseph, Louisiana, and Flint, Michigan).
156 John Eligon, A Question of Environmental Racism in Flint, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/us/a-question-of-environmental-racism-in-flint.html
[https://perma.cc/YF7W-GPPS]. There are many examples of environmental and natural resource
policy implementation with disparate negative impacts on racial minorities in the U.S. See, e.g., David
A. Dana & Deborah Tuerkheimer, After Flint: Environmental Justice as Equal Protection, 111 NW. U.
L. REV. 879, 883 (2017).
157 For a discussion of the following recent water-based, waterborne, and water-related disease
outbreaks, see Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1273–75.
158 Id. at 1274–75 (citing Matt Ford, A Legionnaires’ Disease Outbreak in Flint, ATLANTIC (Jan.
13, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/flint-michigan-water-crisis/424062/
[https://perma.cc/7XWS-D7JQ]).
159 Enrico Bertuzzo et al., On the Probability of Extinction of the Haiti Cholera Epidemic,
30 STOCHASTIC ENVTL. RES. & RISK ASSESSMENT 2043, 2043 (2016); see also Larson, Time of
Cholera, supra note 35, at 1273.
160 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Human Right to Water, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 538
(2007); see also Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1274. “Water scarcity” occurs where
inadequate water quantity or quality prevents water supply from meeting demand during a period of
time. See Water Scarcity, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.html [https://perma.cc/6HHG-PLHM].
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threat to human health posed by such diseases is likely to be aggravated by
global climate change. 161

Given the vital role water plays in so many societal issues, the bounds
of what can be called water law or water policy can be difficult to
delineate.162 Water law thus can take on the “law of the horse” problem,
where the scope of an area of law is defined so broadly that the definition is
meaningless.163 For the purposes of this Article, however, water law and
policy refers to the explicit governance of water rights and water quality,
water delivery and treatment, and the management and mitigation of
drought and flood. Such a definition does not represent the takeover of
other policy spheres by water, nor does it seek to define all policy realms as
essentially only a question of water. Water law and policy does not need to
be defined broadly to address the broad impacts and implications of water
security. A new paradigm that focuses on the expansive implications of
water security, with water law and policy narrowly defined, would
meaningfully advance sustainable and resilient natural resource and
environmental policy, while also addressing issues of climate change, war,
immigration, disease, and inequality.
B. Why Water Security Should Replace Climate Change
The water security paradigm described above should become the
predominant paradigm because it addresses the two fundamental
limitations of the current climate change paradigm. First, unlike the climate
change paradigm, water security integrates the growing demand for food
and energy, as the energy and agriculture sectors are our largest water
consumers.164 Second, the water security paradigm improves upon the
climate change paradigm by making sustainability issues more salient and
accessible to the general public.

161

Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1274–75 (footnote omitted). See generally Lisa
Heinzerling, Climate Change, Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary Principle, 96 GEO. L.J. 445,
447 (2008) (discussing the human health implications of climate change and suggesting that in the face
of climate-induced famine from droughts and deaths from deadly floods, “[t]he weak[] [will] drop[] like
flies” (citation omitted)).
162 See Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 937.
163 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 207 (1996) (arguing against the study of many areas of law impacting a certain industry or even
object (such as a horse), rather than the study of general principles of law, because the former approach
leads to a shallow understanding of essential principles of law).
164 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 950–51.
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1. Virtual Water165
Nearly everything humans do, for better and for worse, can be
expressed in terms of quantity of water. Water is embedded in virtually all
products, a concept called virtual water, with significant virtual water
embedded in energy and food. 166 The production of a single kilogram of
wheat, for example, requires approximately 1,000 liters of water. 167 Water
is similarly embedded in energy, whether as a reactor coolant; steam to turn
turbines; for growth of biofuel crops; in the mining of coal, oil, or natural
gas; or in the components of solar and wind energy sources.168
To complicate matters, virtual energy is similarly embedded in the
treatment and distribution of water. 169 If we move water security to the
forefront in our discussions about sustainability, we will integrate climate
change concerns with the problems associated with increasing global
consumption patterns. That is because we will account for water throughout
the chain of production in agriculture and energy. 170 Of course, the
monitoring and reporting of carbon footprints across the chain of food or
energy production provides important information on climate change
impacts from greenhouse gas emissions. 171 The monitoring, measuring, and
reporting of carbon footprints has thus become an important policy tool in
assessing and mitigating anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, with the
reduction of carbon footprints representing “the sine qua non of good
environmental stewardship.” 172 This focus on carbon footprints creates
incentives to deploy low- or no-carbon energy sources, like nuclear, solar,
wind, and hydroelectric energy.
The climate change paradigm’s focus on greenhouse gas emissions
and carbon footprints fails to account for environmental impacts from these

165 The following discussion of virtual water borrows heavily from my prior writing on the subject.
See id. at 932–35, 952–55.
166
See Allan, Virtual Water, supra note 30, at 5–6.
167 WORLD WATER COUNCIL, E-CONFERENCE SYNTHESIS: VIRTUAL WATER TRADE – CONSCIOUS
CHOICES 3 (2004), http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/wwc/Programs/Virtual_Water/
virtual_water_final_synthesis.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3LU-V284]; see also A. Y. Hoekstra & A. K.
Chapagain, Water Footprints of Nations: Water Use by People as a Function of Their Consumption
Pattern, 21 WATER RESOURCES MGMT. 35, 39 (2007) (finding the virtual water content of wheat to be
1,334 cubic meters per ton).
168 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 933.
169 Id. at 934 (“The energy required to run a faucet for five minutes is equivalent to the energy used
to power a 60-watt light bulb for fourteen hours.”).
170 Id. at 954.
171 See Dave Owen, Climate Change and Environmental Assessment Law, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
57, 112–13 (2008).
172 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 952.
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so-called “green” or “clean” energy sources. 173 Carbon footprint
measurements do not account for other environmental concerns associated
with these low-carbon energy sources, because the production and
transmission of energy affects water consumption and contamination. 174
The effects of extractive industries—coal mining, oil and gas exploration
and extraction, and fracking, among others—on water security are not fully
integrated in carbon footprint analysis. 175 “Carbon footprints also fail to
include the environmental impacts of climate change mitigation
measures . . . .”176 For example, geologic carbon sequestration can cause
groundwater pollution, while green building codes, smart grids, and hybrid
cars can require higher uses of copper and other mined elements. 177
A jurisdiction could lower its carbon footprint by enacting such
building codes, encouraging carbon sequestration, and developing
renewable energy sources like wind, solar, and hydroelectric energy, all
connected to a smart grid intended to lower energy demands. 178 As I wrote
before, “[t]hese efforts would likely significantly reduce the state’s carbon
footprint,” 179 and so they would advance the climate change paradigm.
At the same time, these activities require “the mining of silicon,
copper, gold, tungsten, and other minerals to build the components of solar
cells, wind turbines, ‘green’ buildings, hybrid cars, or smart grids.”180
Carbon footprint analysis would not account for the increased water needed
to cool the nuclear reactors, to grow the biofuels, to replace that lost to
evaporation behind the dam, or to supply the fracking operations that
recover natural gas.181 Neither would it account for the water pollution from
173

Id. at 952–53.
Id. at 952 (citing Alexis Laurent et al., Limitations of Carbon Footprint as Indicator of
Environmental Sustainability, 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4100, 4105–06 (2012)).
175 Id. (citing Laurent et al., supra note 174, at 4105–06).
176 Id. at 952–53.
177 Id.; see also AM. P UBLIC POWER ASS’N, CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE: ANALYSIS OF
POTENTIAL LIABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION DUE TO GEOLOGICAL
SEQUESTRATION
OPERATIONS
5
(2008),
http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/
APPA%20CCS%20white%20paper%20Waters%20of%20the%20US.pdf
[https://perma.cc/43L6RGU9] (discussing potential groundwater contamination from geologic sequestration of carbon);
RESNICK INST. OF TECH., CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR S USTAINABLE ENERGY APPLICATIONS 4 (Neil
Fromer et al. eds., 2011), http://resnick.caltech.edu/docs/R_Critical.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3DZ-U3CR]
(discussing increased demand for copper and other metals from green building codes and smart
technologies).
178 For a similar but more detailed hypothetical, see Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at
953.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. For further discussion, see P.W. Gerbens-Leenes et al., The Water Footprint of Energy from
Biomass: A Quantitative Assessment and Consequences of an Increasing Share of Bio-Energy in
174
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nuclear waste disposal, fracking, geologic sequestration, or hydroelectric
dams.182 In short, the monitoring and reporting regime of the climate
change paradigm is incomplete and provides an inadequate assessment of
sustainable and environmentally responsible practices. 183
A water footprint is similar to a carbon footprint, in that just as a
carbon footprint reflects carbon emissions associated with a product or
activity, a water footprint reflects water consumption associated with a
product or activity. 184 A water footprint metric addresses fossil fuel energy
production like a carbon footprint because it would account for the water
used in that energy production. 185 Water footprints would also integrate the
impacts of pollution and water consumptions from across the entire chain
of production of no- or low-carbon energy sources such as nuclear energy,
hydroelectric, natural gas, biofuels, wind, and solar. 186 Water footprints
would also account for impacts to water quality from pollution. 187
Additionally, “water footprint[s] . . . provide necessary information on
sustainability issues arising from increased consumption attributable to
population growth and economic development.” 188
Furthermore, water footprints would provide a better understanding of
how countries could face water insecurity through virtual water exports.
Consider the following example:
Fracking fluid frequently contains an emulsifier produced from the seed of the
guar plant. The rapid [global] expansion of fracking . . . has resulted in a rising

Energy Supply, 68 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1052, 1058 (2009) (comparing the water footprints of “the most
important primary energy carriers”—“crude oil, coal, natural gas, uranium, electricity from
hydropower, solar energy and wind” (citation omitted)); Benjamin K Sovacool & Alex Gilbert,
Developing Adaptive and Integrated Strategies for Managing the Electricity-Water Nexus, 48 U. RICH.
L. REV. 997, 1000 (2014).
182 See Alex Funk & Benjamin K. Sovacool, Wasted Opportunities: Resolving the Impasse in
United States Nuclear Waste Policy, 34 ENERGY L.J. 113, 121–23, 135 (2013) (noting the risk of
groundwater contamination from nuclear waste); P.W. Gerbens-Leenes et al., supra note 181.
183 See Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 950–55.
184 See Lidija Čuček et al., A Review of Footprint Analysis Tools for Monitoring Impacts on
Sustainability, 34 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 9, 11 (2012); see also, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Sustainable
Consumption, Energy Policy, and Individual Well-Being, 65 VAND. L. REV . 1479, 1509–10 (2012)
(giving the water footprints of several different foods).
185 See, e.g., Corinne D. Scown et al., Water Footprint of U.S. Transportation Fuels, 45 ENVTL.
SCI. & TECH. 2541 (2011) (providing an example of how water footprints can be used to measure
impacts from the combustion, consumption, and production of fossil fuels).
186 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 952–55.
187 Id. at 954. “[W]ater footprint[s] would also provide necessary information on sustainability
issues arising from increased consumption attributable to population growth and economic
development.” Id. at 955.
188 Id. (citing A. Ertug Ercin & Arjen Y. Hoekstra, Water Footprint Scenarios for 2050: A Global
Analysis, 64 ENV’T INT’L 71, 71–72 (2014)).
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demand for guar, with the international price of guar seed rising from $4 per
kilogram to $30 per kilogram in an eighteen-month period. Thousands of
acres of crops formerly used for food production have been converted to the
production of guar in India and Pakistan . . . . [G]uar may be a less droughtresilient and more water-intensive crop than many of the food crops it
replaces. 189

This replacement of food crops with increased guar production has the
potential to raise food prices. 190
Guar production may facilitate a shift to cleaner natural gas in some
nations with fracking operations but increase water insecurity in nations
replacing food crops with guar.191 A shift to a water footprint metric will
capture the impacts of these kinds of policies as virtual water moves around
the world in global trade, determining “whether guar exports have the net
effect of achieving water security in one nation at the expense of water
security in another.”192
2. Accessibility
Psychological research suggests that as temporal and spatial distance
increases, “mental representations become . . . more abstract” and mental
prioritization less likely. 193 In other words, people are unlikely to
understand or prioritize sustainability issues unless they immediately hit
home. That is especially problematic for climate change, as the general
public often perceives climate change’s impacts to be uncertain, temporally
and spatially attenuated, and “not personally relevant.” 194 Even if citizens
accept climate change as relevant and important, “it [still] must compete
with other[, more salient] issues for priority.” 195
To more effectively convey sustainability concerns to the general
public, these concerns must be framed in ways that are proximal in both
time and space. 196 And the message of climate change that hits most
189

Id. at 944–45 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 945.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 955.
193 Leila Scannell & Robert Gifford, Personally Relevant Climate Change: The Role of Place
Attachment and Local Versus Global Message Framing in Engagement, 45 ENV’T & BEHAV. 60, 62
(2013).
194 Id. at 61.
195 Id. at 61–62.
196 Id. at 63; see also Anthony Leiserowitz, Communicating the Risks of Global Warming:
American Risk Perceptions, Affective Images, and Interpretive Communities, in CREATING A CLIMATE
FOR CHANGE: COMMUNICATING CLIMATE CHANGE AND FACILITATING SOCIAL CHANGE 44, 53–54
(Susanne C. Moser & Lisa Dilling eds., 2007) (suggesting that in order to effectively communicate the
risk of global warming, it is necessary to communicate that threats are local and immediate).
190
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immediately and closest to home is a message of water variability and
extreme weather events like droughts and floods. 197 The water security
paradigm speaks directly in these terms and, indeed, will reform laws to
govern on the more local and regional level, rather than the hierarchicalgovernance model of the climate change paradigm. Ultimately, any person
can intuitively understand water waste and water pollution, and the
challenge of water scarcity. But the concepts of carbon emissions,
greenhouse gases, and their impacts on global climate patterns are far from
intuitive, accessible, or even spatially and temporally proximal to most
people. The water footprint metric focuses sustainability on the intuitive
concept of water waste. Furthermore, a water footprint metric can be
tailored to be understood and monitored within the specific geographic and
cultural context in which it is used, by factoring in scarcity, cultural and
recreational values, and ecological concerns. Climate change’s reliance on
carbon footprints requires broader monitoring of sources and impacts
divorced from geographic or cultural context.
C. Governance Under the Water Security Paradigm198
The shift from the climate change paradigm to the water security
paradigm is in many ways about governance. Indeed, it addresses the
“Goldilocks governance challenge”—governance must be scaled so that
jurisdiction is neither too big nor too small. 199 The scope of governance
“must be just right to rein in transaction costs and limit externalities.” 200 If
the scope of jurisdiction is too big, there will be too many stakeholders who
are too remote from one another and unfamiliar with local conditions, thus
unnecessarily increasing transaction costs.201 If the scope of jurisdiction is

197

See Scannell & Gifford, supra note 193, at 63.
For a more detailed discussion of the role of appropriate jurisdictional boundaries in creating
effective water policy, see Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, from which I have borrowed
extensively for this Section.
199 Id. at 910–11.
200 Id. at 910 (citing R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (noting the
relationship between transaction costs and externalities)); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental
Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 584–85 (1996); Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some
Considerations for Water Law, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1010–11 (2005)).
201 Id. at 910–11 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Robert
D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8,
63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010) (for a general discussion of the role of transaction costs on
intergovernmental cooperation and federalism)).
198
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too small, it will produce negative externalities to neighboring
jurisdictions.202 Consider the following example:
[I]f two [jurisdictions] share a river and the jurisdictional boundaries [do not
correspond to the watershed], one [jurisdiction] can dam or pollute the river
and externalize the costs of water scarcity or water contamination to its
neighbor. If those [jurisdictions] share a river and the [boundaries incorporate
many basins at a national or supra-national level], water management will be
inefficient because stakeholders will be attenuated from management
decisions and managers will be less familiar with the unique regional
conditions associated with the river. 203

The Goldilocks governance challenge partially explains the failures of
previous natural resource policy paradigms. The pollution occurring as a
function of the industrial paradigm occurred in part because industries
operated in, and were largely regulated by, one jurisdiction while
externalizing the costs of contamination to downstream and downwind
neighboring jurisdictions. 204 Hierarchists continue to advance a top-down,
global governance approach in the climate change paradigm, but this
approach has advanced slowly in large part because the transaction costs of
negotiating with so many diverse counties are simply too high. 205
As the previous section shows, both policies and messaging should
take into account local considerations. Thus, determinations of the optimal
quantity and quality should be made at the river-basin level, where unique
cultural characteristics and physical conditions of each basin can be
considered.206 The water security paradigm should not be led by
entrepreneurs, ethicists, or hierarchists like previous natural resource policy
paradigms.207 Top-down, hierarchical governance approaches are frequently
ineffective because they depend on “thin simplifications” of complex
systems.208 Though hierarchists encourage reliance on expertise and policy
integration, they are too far removed from the locus of most actual policy
implementation and thus frequently fail to understand how communities
202 Id. at 911 (citing Esty, supra note 200, at 601–02; Charles Fried, Federalism—Why Should We
Care?, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (1982) (for a general discussion of the role of externalities on
intergovernmental cooperation and federalism)).
203 Id. (footnotes omitted).
204 See generally Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32 (discussing the role of jurisdictional
scaling in exacerbating externalities like air and water pollution).
205 Shi-Ling Hsu, A Game-Theoretic Model of International Climate Change Negotiations,
19 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 14, 24 (2011).
206 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 911–12.
207 See supra Section I.A.
208 JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN
CONDITIONS HAVE FAILED 309–12 (1998).
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organize themselves and respond to social problems. 209 Entrepreneurs
encourage development and investment but externalize costs. Ethicists
encourage cost internalization and grassroots engagement but lack
expertise and an integrated, holistic agenda.
Rather, the water security paradigm should be led by regionalists—
advocates embedded within the river basin and familiar with the unique
sociocultural, economic, hydrologic, and climatologic characteristics of
that geographic unit, defined by the limits of the watershed. 210 An
illustration from my earlier work on jurisdiction may help clarify my
meaning:
For purposes of water management, the world is like a golf ball—a sphere
pocked with dimples. Each dimple is a river basin, or catchment, and the
boundaries between those dimples are watersheds. All water within a basin
drains to a common point . . . . [and thus] . . . naturally internalizes the costs
associated with water scarcity and quality. 211

The regionalist governance of water security, using water footprints as its
tool for monitoring and measuring, would provide a more nuanced and
understandable governance approach than the hierarchical climate change
paradigm.
With this regionalist approach in mind, the water security paradigm
should be grounded geographically at the basin level for two reasons. First,
those most familiar with the unique climate, geology, hydrology, economy,
and culture of water should be those who advance the water security
paradigm. The chemistry, ecology, and uses of water vary not only from
one river to another but even between stretches of the same river. 212 Water
changes in its ecologic and economic character as it flows from mountains,
valleys, deserts, and deltas and through farms, cities, and indigenous
communities. Water also has an important cultural meaning that is distinct
from other natural resources. No one playfully squirts oil or throws lumps
of coal at each other, and you never hear of people being baptized in
uranium. Water is different from other resources—not only because of its
cultural, aesthetic, and religious significance—but because that significance
changes as water flows through different communities, from one that sees
the river as perennial, a source of fish, and sacred in highlands, and then
209

See Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 924.
See id.
211 Id. at 911–12 (footnotes omitted).
212 K.J. Gregory, The Human Role in Changing River Channels, 79 GEOMORPHOLOGY 172, 175–
80 (2006); Luis Filipe Gomes Lopes et al., Hydrodynamics and Water Quality Modelling in a Regulated
River Segment: Application on the Instream Flow Definition, 173 ECOLOGICAL MODELLING 197, 198–
201 (2004).
210
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through another where the river flow is intermittent and largely a source of
seasonal recreation. Regionalists are best situated to appreciate these
nuances, because top-down planners will be unable to capture the dispersed
knowledge of individual communities. 213
Second, water is a spillover common pool resource, meaning that it
often crosses jurisdictional boundaries. 214 Under the “internalization
prescription” for spillover commons:
[J]urisdiction [should] be assigned over spillover commons at the smallest
scale that internalizes the effects of management decisions. In the case of
spillover commons, jurisdictional boundaries must be redrawn, wherever
possible, to conform to the geographic contours of the resource . . . . The
watershed is thus the natural jurisdictional boundary, and the [drainage basin]
the appropriate scale of jurisdiction . . . .215

By basing governance boundaries on the watershed, the costs of water
management will be internalized.216 Unfortunately, governance institutions
have historically taken the opposite approach, using rivers as political
boundaries to frustrating, and sometimes disastrous, results.217
The water security paradigm’s focus on basin-level governance helps
limit transactions costs by narrowing the field of stakeholders to those most
familiar with and interested in the shared commons. 218 Basin-level
governance facilitates cost internalization and avoids negative externalities
by redrawing jurisdictional boundaries to correspond to the geographic
contours of the spillover commons—the basin.219 The water security
paradigm’s focus on basin-level governance by regionalists thus strikes the
right balance in the Goldilocks governance challenge by making the scope
of jurisdiction just the right size to limit transaction costs while avoiding
externalities.220

213

See generally F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945)
(arguing that centralized top-down planning will not achieve the efficiencies of an open market in part
because the knowledge of a single agent will not equal the accumulated and specialized knowledge of
diverse and dispersed agents).
214 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 910.
215 Id. at 911–12 (footnotes omitted).
216 See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 106–10 (2000) (explaining, but also
criticizing, the “conventional economic prescription” that the best jurisdiction to provide spillover
goods like water is a “special district” that “encompass[es] the natural region affected by pollution”).
217 See Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 917 (discussing the example of the
Colorado River as a boundary between three states creating long-term legal disputes over the shared
resource).
218 Id. at 926–27.
219 See id. at 927–28; see also COOTER, supra note 216, at 105–07.
220 See Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 927–28.
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Of course, most jurisdictional boundaries do not correspond to the
geographic contours of basins. Indeed, in 1868, explorer John Wesley
Powell recommended to Congress that state boundaries in the western
territories of the U.S. be based on river basins. 221 Congress ignored his
recommendations and, in some instances, even made the river itself the
state boundary.222 Indeed, the great irony of Powell’s legacy is that, despite
his revolutionary prescriptions regarding rivers, the reservoir that bears his
name, Lake Powell, sits astride the Arizona–Utah border.223 And what has
resulted has either been high transaction costs associated with federal
control of water resources (such as with the Clean Water Act 224) or the
externalities associated with state control of water resources (such as water
rights disputes over shared rivers). 225 But sovereignty concerns make
redrawing the boundaries to correspond to the basin politically problematic,
if not impossible. 226 Yet certain legal reforms can help to facilitate basinlevel, interjurisdictional governance. At the international level, river
treaties often establish international river basin commissions. 227 At the
domestic level, in the United States, interstate compacts can establish
interstate river basin commissions. 228
Often, these transboundary river commissions lack meaningful
regulatory authority, or even sufficient resources to facilitate cooperation
and information exchange, in part because member jurisdictions fear
turning over sovereignty to the commission. 229 To alleviate this concern,
221 Id. at 916–17; see generally J.W. POWELL, THE EXPLORATION OF THE COLORADO RIVER AND
ITS CANYONS (Dover Publications Inc. 1961) (1895) (recommending, in a report to Congress, that
watersheds serve as jurisdictional boundaries for western states).
222 For a brief collection of recent scholarship reviewing Powell’s arguments, see Larson,
Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 917 n.41.
223 Id. at 916–17.
224 See Brandon Hofmeister, Roles for State Energy Regulators in Climate Change Mitigation,
2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 67, 79 (2012); Martin A. McCrory, Standing in the Ever-Changing
Stream: The Clean Water Act, Article III Standing, and Post-Compliance Adjudication, 20 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 73, 77 (2001) (noting that ambiguity involving Clean Water Act jurisdiction has resulted in
uncertainties that raise transaction costs associated with permitting projects that may discharge to
jurisdictional waters).
225 See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (illustrating the prolonged and complex
litigation involved in interstate water disputes).
226 See Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 962.
227
“For example, the International Borders and Water Commission (IBWC) manages the Colorado
River under the 1944 Rivers Treaty between the U.S. and Mexico.” Rhett Larson, Augmented Water
Law, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 757, 768 (2016) [hereinafter Larson, Augmented Water Law].
228 See, e.g., Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688, 691 (1961) (“The
Delaware River Basin Commission is hereby created as a body politic and corporate . . . . The
commission shall consist of the Governors of the signatory states, ex officio, and one commissioner to
be appointed by the President of the United States . . . .”).
229 See Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 952–54.
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such commissions “should be subject to a judicially enforceable fiduciary
duty” embodied in the organic instrument (whether compact or treaty) “to
manage spillover commons for the benefit of all . . . jurisdictions” sharing
the water.230 This would help avoid one jurisdiction co-opting the
commission to its sole benefit and ensure adequate legal leverage for
individual commission members to influence the commission and ensure
that they have not sacrificed sovereignty, while still empowering the
commission to avoid negative externalities and minimize transaction
costs.231 Such leverage can be based on a disgorgement remedy for any
breach of the commission’s fiduciary duty, as specified in the compact or
treaty. Commission membership should also reflect the major industries,
ethnic groups, utilities, and municipalities in the basin, thereby ensuring
that transboundary commissions are led by regionalists in an effort to
achieve water security. 232
Regionalists frequently have knowledge about social norms adapted
over generations to unique regional conditions, including norms critical to
natural resource development like cooperation and dispute resolution, that
will not be captured by a hierarchist paradigm like climate change. 233 Rivers
like the Ganges or the Jordan have unique religious significance best
understood by regionalists.234 Rivers with headwaters located in developed
countries, like the Colorado River, may have more than a 1,000 days of
reservoir storage to serve their populations, but 1,000 days of reservoir
storage to serve the population relying on the Brahmaputra River would
flood an area the size of Pakistan. 235 Top-down, attenuated, supranational
management tends toward the one-size-fits-all approach to governance, and
that approach is inappropriate when rivers require solutions tailor-made to
their unique geographies.236 Interstate compacts and regional international

230 Id. at 915. For a similar argument relating to implementation of a human right to water, see
Larson, The New Right, supra note 26, at 2257–58.
231 See Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 952–54.
232 See id.
233 See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991) (demonstrating how local resource users develop effective management regimes
through intimate knowledge of unique resources and familiarity with norms that evolve over time).
234 Rhett B. Larson, Holy Water and Human Rights: Indigenous Peoples’ Religious-Rights Claims
to Water Resources, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 81, 109 (2011) [hereinafter Larson, Holy Water].
235
Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 956 (comparing storage capacity in Colorado
and other basins); Margaret A. Palmer et al., Climate Change and the World’s River Basins:
Anticipating Management Options, 6 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 81 (2008) (noting the challenges
of land loss associated with storage).
236 Cf. A. Dan Tarlock, Federalism Without Preemption: A Case Study in Bioregionalism, 27 PAC.
L.J. 1629, 1634–36 (1996) (explaining that state and local cooperation has been necessary for federal
biodiversity regulation to have its intended effect).
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treaties should effectively redraw jurisdictional boundaries to correspond to
the geographic contours of river basins. 237 Interbasin jurisdiction will be too
remote from such adapted social norms, so treaties and compacts, granting
basin-level jurisdiction to commissions, should redraw jurisdictional
boundaries to empower regionalists. While political obstacles, in particular
concerns of sovereignty, will be significant, these obstacles may erode in
the face of the realities of water insecurity caused by growing populations,
economic development, natural resources conflicts, plagues, and droughts
and floods brought on by climate change.
III. WATER SECURITY AND THE LAW
A shift to the water security paradigm will have broad implications for
natural resource law. As detailed above, the most obvious of these
implications include the use of water footprints as a reporting and
monitoring tool and the leadership of regionalists at the river basin level.
These legal reforms will help ensure that the water security paradigm
predominates. Other legal reforms will be essential to redirect natural
resource policy toward achieving an acceptable quantity and quality of
water at acceptable costs and risks.
This Section proposes three legal reforms to advance global water
security: (A) the recognition of a sustainable human right to water, (B) the
integration of the Green Agenda (water quality) and the Blue Agenda
(water supply) with what this Article calls the Red Agenda (disease vector
habitat) in water law, and (C) the establishment of legal incentives for
investment in water technology innovation and water infrastructure,
including desalination and responsible dam development. These reforms
not only will serve to advance water security but also would reflect legal
innovations that are more likely to be implemented successfully under a
water security paradigm than the current climate change paradigm.
A. Recognizing a Sustainable Human Right to Water
“There are only two kinds of people on earth—people with enough
[clean] water to stay alive and dead people.” 238 Water is often
understandably referred to as a human right, and forty-one nations
incorporate it as an express right in their constitutions. 239 A growing chorus
of voices has been calling for recognition of an international human right to

237 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32 (arguing for spillover commons to be regulated
based on their geographic contours).
238 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 958.
239 Larson, The New Right, supra note 26, at 2184.
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water.240 In the United States, California has recently enacted its own
“Human Right to Water Bill,” 241 and water shutoffs in Detroit have
increased calls to recognize the human right to water domestically.242
Recognizing the right to water is an important part of advancing water
security. The rhetorical force of recognizing a human right would raise the
“lexical priority” of water issues and help to reorient policy toward the
water security paradigm. 243 An enforceable human right to water effectively
puts first things first—what good are other rights to someone dying of
cholera or thirst?244 Additionally, an enforceable human right provides legal
leverage to disadvantaged or marginalized groups to secure environmental
justice.245 However, the formulation of the human right to water, at the
domestic and international levels, often leaves open for interpretation
critical questions, including the amount, price, and proximity necessary to
satisfy such a right. 246
Put simply, the right must be enforceable and not merely aspirational.
If recognizing a right to water is to help achieve water security by more
appropriately prioritizing water and providing leverage for disadvantaged
communities to access this critical resource, then the right to water must be
formulated and implemented in ways that are achievable, sustainable, and
enforceable.247 It is insufficient to simply state that a human right to water
guarantees provision of water of adequate quantity and quality to keep
people alive.
240

See G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶¶ 5, 8 (July 28, 2010) (acknowledging that access to drinking water is an
“integral component” of expanding human rights); see also Peter H. Gleick, The Human Right to Water,
1 WATER POL’Y 487, 489 (1999) (“This paper . . . concludes that international law, international
agreements and evidence from the practice of States strongly and broadly support the human right to a
basic water requirement.”); Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and
International Implications, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1992) (“Access to adequate amounts of
safe, useable fresh water should be recognized as a human right.”).
241 CAL. WATER CODE § 106.3(a) (West 2013); see generally ANGÉLICA SALCEDA ET AL., INT’L
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, SCHOOL OF LAW, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO
WATER BILL IN CALIFORNIA: AN IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK FOR S TATE AGENCIES (2013),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Water_Report_2013_Interactive_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YGX2-C2P2] (providing background and evaluation of California’s Human Right to
Water Bill). For a more detailed discussion of this California statute, see Larson, Adapting Human
Rights, supra note 33, at 4–5.
242 See Larson, Adapting Human Rights, supra note 33, at 3–4; see also Alisa Priddle & Matt
Helms, Bankruptcy Judge Tells Detroit to Address Water Shutoffs, USA TODAY (July 16, 2014, 1:27
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/07/16/detroit-bankruptcy-water/12734925/
[https://perma.cc/63H5-WFJC?type=image].
243 See Larson, The New Right, supra note 26, at 2209.
244 See id. at 2198.
245 Id. at 2244.
246 Larson, Adapting Human Rights, supra note 33, at 20–22.
247 Id.
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For example, the Republic of Ecuador recognized the right to water
under its constitution in 2008. 248 Article 3 states that a prime duty of the
government is to guarantee water for all citizens. 249 Article 12 provides that
the human right to water is fundamental and nonwaivable.250 Article 66
provides that the right to drinking water is recognized and guaranteed to all
people.251 And Article 318 states: “Water is a strategic national resource for
public use and the State’s control over water is inalienable and nonwaivable, and water constitutes a vital element for nature and the existence
of human beings. All forms of water privatization are prohibited.” 252
Despite the strong rhetoric, the constitutional right to water in Ecuador fails
to clarify the quantity, quality, and price of water. Prohibitions on water
privatization in Ecuador may limit the water sector’s access to credit and
capital, making questions of water costs and pricing all the more difficult to
answer. In part, because these questions typically remain unanswered when
a constitutional right is formulated, such rights do not lead to better water
provision.253
India also has a “provision right” to water, one it has inferred from
Article 21 of its Constitution. 254 India’s Supreme Court has stated that “the
right to access to clean drinking water is fundamental to life and there is a
duty on the State under Article 21 to provide clean drinking water to its
citizens.” 255 Despite the recognition of this right, 17% of the population of
India does not have access to tapped, treated water, including 38% of urban
residents.256
Clearly, when we speak of a human right to water we are talking not
only about life but about a certain standard of living. That standard raises
questions about cost, access, quality, and consistency of service making it
necessary that a human right to water be accompanied by certain legal
reforms to answer those questions.

248

CONSTITUCIΌN POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR [C.P.].
Id. art. 3, § 1.
250 Id. art. 12.
251 Id. art. 66, § 2.
252 Id. art. 318 (author’s translation).
253 See David Zetland, Water Rights and Human Rights: The Poor Will Not Need Our Charity if
We Need Their Water 5–7 (Aug. 11, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1549570 [https://perma.cc/4EMN-6TJT].
254 See INDIA CONST. art. 21 (“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law.”); Larson, The New Right, supra note 26, at 2188.
255 Larson, The New Right, supra note 26, at 2188 (citing A.P. Pollution Control Bd. II v. Naidu,
2000 Supp. 5 S.C.R. 249).
256 Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q.
957, 981 (2004).
249
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One possible reform to make a right to water more easily enforceable
is to reimagine the right to water as a “participation right” rather than a
“provision right.” 257 As shown by the constitution of Ecuador, a provision
right would impose an obligation upon the state to provide water to its
citizens and is the typical formulation of the right to water. 258 In contrast, a
participation right does not guarantee water provision but instead
guarantees a citizen’s right to be free from discrimination or cruel treatment
in water provision, to receive adequate notice of water cutoffs or rate
increases, and to participate in the transparent development of water policy
through stakeholder meetings. 259
Two court decisions in southern Africa illustrate the potential
advantages of a participation right over a provision right in promoting
water security. South Africa was one of the first countries to recognize a
constitutional right to water and formulated it as a provision right. 260 The
right proved economically and ecologically unsustainable 261 because South
Africa implemented the right in a way that made cost recovery difficult. 262
Without effective water pricing, consumers had little incentive to conserve
water, and water utilities would not invest in improving and maintaining
infrastructure. 263 Disputes over water pricing led to extensive litigation,
with the South African Constitutional Court ultimately deferring to the
water utility’s decision to require prepayment of water services beyond the
provision of a free basic quantity of water. 264
In contrast, litigation in Botswana provides an example of how a
participation right may be more easily enforceable. 265 In the years prior to
257

See Larson, The New Right, supra note 26, at 2186.
Id. at 2187.
259 See id. at 2186.
260 Id. at 2210; see S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 27(1) (“Everyone has the right to have access to . . .
sufficient food and water . . . .”).
261 Larson, The New Right, supra note 26, at 2211–13. Under the flat-fee approach, South Africa
lost over 600 billion liters a year as a result of nonrevenue water, at an annual total cost of R 3.259
billion or approximately $390 million. Nonrevenue water includes water delivered to legal connections
but without payment and water delivered to illegal water connections. SA Losing 600bn Litres of Water,
NEWS 24 (Feb. 15, 2007, 1:36 PM), http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/SA-losing-600bnlitres-of-water-20070215 [https://perma.cc/7WSH-LDL5]. Phiri had the highest levels of nonrevenue
water in the city of Johannesburg. Larson, The New Right, supra note 26, at 2253.
262 See id. at 2211–12.
263 Id. at 2210–25 (providing an overview of the facts and underlying circumstances of the
Mazibuko case and the water supply and provision challenges in South Africa).
264
Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 65 para. 124 (S. Afr.),
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2009/28.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9NZ-E7VQ]; Larson, The New
Right, supra note 26, at 2212–13.
265 Mosetlhanyane v. Attorney General, No. CACLB-074-10 (BwCA Jan. 27, 2011) (Bots.),
https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/cases/Domestic-HR_to_Water/Bushmen-Water-Appeal258
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the case in question, the Botswanan government had sought to remove the
indigenous Basarwa community from a government-created game preserve
in the Kalahari Desert. 266 In an effort to force the Basarwa to leave, the
government decommissioned the community’s wells. 267 Ultimately, in a
lawsuit brought by the community, the court restored the community’s
rights based on a claim that depriving them of their water violated the
community’s right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment under
Section 7(1) of the Constitution of Botswana. 268 Such a prohibition against
government restraint on personal liberty falls within the meaning of a
participation right because such a right is fundamentally about the freedom
to engage in the political process without fear of state retaliation.
The success of the Basarwa in Botswana in enforcing a participation
right to water, compared to the failure to enforce a provision right in South
Africa, suggests that the participation right may be a preferable formulation
of the right to water. 269 A participation right does not require water
provision at low or no cost and thus does not raise the same sustainability
concerns as a provision right. Additionally, participation rights tend to be
more jurisprudentially mature than the relatively recent innovation of
constitutional provision rights and thus more easily enforced in court. 270
Even if a state does seek to create and implement a provision right,
certain reforms can ensure that such a right does not give rise to
unsustainable water practices. 271 First, courts with unique expertise in water
law, science, and policy should adjudicate questions and disputes involving
water law.272 One of the reasons the South African Constitutional Court
upheld water cutoffs and prepaid rates was that the court lacked the
institutional competency to evaluate the public water utility’s technical
opinions on water sustainability and pricing. 273

Judgement-Jan_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MCT-6X2K]. For further discussion of the Matsipane case,
see Larson, The New Right, supra note 26, at 2237–39.
266 Mosetlhanyane, No. CACLB-074-10, ¶¶ 5–8.
267 Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
268 Id. ¶¶ 20–21, 25 (citing BOTS. CONST. § 7(1), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/
en/bw/bw008en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GQA-6MZQ]).
269 Larson, The New Right, supra note 26, at 2237.
270 See id. at 2243–44.
271 See generally Larson, Adapting Human Rights, supra note 33 (suggesting reforms for the
effective and sustainable implementation of a human right to water).
272 Cf. Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special Masters,
43 EMORY L.J. 927, 952–53 (1994) (noting the role of special masters to enhance a court’s institutional
competence in highly technical fields).
273 See Larson, Adapting Human Rights, supra note 33, at 38–39 (also noting the need for
specialized tribunals in states seeking to implement a positive right to public utilities).
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Second, jurisdictions should implement block rates for water pricing
with directed subsidies—in the form of “water stamps”—provided to poor
households that cannot afford to pay the full cost of basic water
provision.274 With block rates, a basic amount of water for domestic use
would be priced well below cost. 275 With each additional block of water
consumed, the rate increases so that the largest water consumers (energy
and agriculture, typically) pay the highest rates, higher than the full cost of
provision.276 Those higher rates would encourage water conservation in the
industries best placed to achieve water savings. 277 Those higher rates would
then be used to subsidize water stamps. Poor individuals or families would
pay what they could for their basic water block, based on an “ability-to-pay
determination” made by the municipal government, with the difference
made up by water stamps. 278 In this way, everyone pays for water and
internalizes the costs of water consumption, but economically
disadvantaged people have those costs partially offset by direct subsidies
funded by rates paid by the largest water consumers. 279
The danger in this approach is that the cost of higher water rates will
be passed on to poor communities through higher food and energy prices. 280
Additional support would be necessary to ensure a minimum standard of
living, including directed food subsidies to economically disadvantaged
households and electricity rates at the household level set at affordable
rates in poorer communities. Despite the challenge in implementing block
rates, prioritizing equitable and sustainable water provision represents a
potential starting point and an emphasis that would move the world toward
water security. 281

274 Id. at 42; see generally Pablo Serra, Subsidies in Chilean Public Utilities (World Bank Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
2445,
2000),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
850051468768861504/pdf/multi-page.pdf [https://perma.cc/28PE-RMGV] (describing a similar
directed subsidy approach in water provision to poor communities in Chilean municipalities).
275
Larson, Adapting Human Rights, supra note 33, at 41–42. But see JOHN J. BOLAND & DALE
WHITTINGTON, WATER TARIFF DESIGN IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: DISADVANTAGES OF INCREASING
BLOCK TARIFFS (IBTS) AND ADVANTAGES OF UNIFORM PRICE WITH REBATE (UPR) DESIGNS (The
Environment for Development Initiative) ((2000), http://www.efdinitiative.org/sites/default/files/
071f_water20tariff20design.pdf [https://perma.cc/TH2M-AMPJ] (criticizing the use of block tariff
regimes in developing countries).
276 Larson, Adapting Human Rights, supra note 33, at 41.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 42.
279 Id. at 42–43.
280 Id. at 43 (“The embedded nature of water and energy – virtual water and virtual energy –
make[s] it difficult to establish equitable pricing of these utility services [and food] without any
increased block rates being reflected in the costs of other goods and services.”).
281 Id.
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B. Integrating Public Health Concerns into Water Law282
Perhaps no element of water policy threatens security more than the
potential for water-related disease outbreaks. As noted above, water
represents both a pathway of transmission and a critical component in
prevention of pathogens. 283 One of the most important ways in which the
connection between water and disease has been framed is in the
classification of diseases by how they are transmitted through water—a
system called the Bradley Classifications in epidemiology. 284 The system
classifies a host of various diseases into four categories based on mode of
transmission.285
In my previous work, I have described the importance of the Bradley
Classification system in illustrating the importance of water management in
the prevention and mitigation of disease outbreaks and noted how the
classification system demonstrates the sheer number of major diseases
associated with water management. 286 The first class includes waterborne
infections, such as cholera or typhoid, which are transmitted directly
through ingestion of water tainted with the disease-causing microbial
pathogen.287 These diseases can be prevented through improved sanitation
infrastructure to prevent fecal contamination and improved treatment of
drinking water, including disinfection by chlorine or ultraviolet light. 288 The
second class includes water-washed infections, such as trachoma or
scabies, which arise because of inadequate water for hygiene. 289 Indeed, one

282
For a lengthy discussion of the need for integration of the Blue, Green, and Red Agendas, see
Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, from which the following Section borrows extensively.
283 Id. at 1274; see also supra Section II.A.
284 See also C.L. Moe, What are the Criteria for Determining Whether a Disease Is Zoonotic and
Water Related?, in WATERBORNE ZOONOSES: IDENTIFICATION, CAUSES AND CONTROL 27, 31–34 (J.A.
Cotruvo et al. eds., 2004) (summarizing the Bradley Classifications and providing examples and
background for each category). See generally GILBERT F. WHITE ET AL., DRAWERS OF WATER:
DOMESTIC WATER USE IN EAST AFRICA (1972) (a longitudinal study of water use in Ugandan villages
that represents the initial research upon which the Bradley Classifications are based and the earliest
articulation of the classifications).
285 Moe, supra note 284, at 31–34; see also D. D. Mara & R. G. A. Feachem, Water- and ExcretaRelated Diseases: Unitary Environmental Classification, 125 J. ENVTL. ENGINEERING 334, 334 (1999)
(providing a table summary of the Bradley Classifications).
286 Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1291–96.
287
Moe, supra note 284, at 32.
288
See, e.g., Thomas Clasen et al., Microbiological Effectiveness and Cost of Disinfecting Water by
Boiling in Semi-Urban India, 79 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 407, 407 (2008); J.V. Pinfold,
Faecal Contamination of Water and Fingertip-Rinses as a Method for Evaluating the Effect of LowCost Water Supply and Sanitation Activities on Faeco-Oral Disease Transmission. I. A Case Study in
Rural North-East Thailand, 105 EPIDEMIOLOGY & INFECTION 363, 374 (1990); Mark A. Shannon et al.,
Science and Technology for Water Purification in the Coming Decades, 452 NATURE 301, 302 (2008).
289 Mara & Feachem, supra note 285, at 334–35.
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of the keys to long-term control of water-related diseases is simply
ensuring a sufficient quantity and quality of water to allow for basic
hygiene.290 The third class includes water-based infections such as guinea
worm and schistosomiasis, where the pathogen spends part of its life inside
vectors whose primary habitat is aquatic, such as snails or water fleas.291
The fourth class includes water-related infections where the disease vector
breeds in water, such as mosquitoes, but the diseases spread via other
means, such as insect bites.292 These water-related infections include
malaria, Zika, West Nile virus, Dengue fever, yellow fever, and
chikungunya.293 They collectively represent one of the greatest threats to
human life,294 with malaria alone killing an estimated 584,000 people in
2013.295
Despite the significant role water plays in epidemiology, water law
itself often fails to address public health concerns.296 The Red, Green, and
Blue Agendas of water law interact in many ways. Water law typically
focuses on the Blue Agenda and the Green Agenda but fails to fully
integrate the Red Agenda.297 The water security paradigm must more fully
integrate the Red Agenda in water law and policy. 298 The Venn diagram
below, drawn from my previous work, provides an illustration upon which
a discussion of these interactions can be based.

290

See id. at 338.
Moe, supra note 284, at 32–33; see also Bruno Gryseels et al., Human Schistosomiasis,
368 LANCET 1106, 1113 (2006) (reporting that schistosomiasis affects 200 million people worldwide,
with as many as 280,000 deaths annually in sub-Saharan Africa alone).
292
Mara & Feachem, supra note 285, at 335.
293 Id. at 336 (noting malaria and Dengue fever as examples); Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note
35, at 1295.
294 Duane J. Gubler, Resurgent Vector-Borne Diseases as a Global Health Problem, 4 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 442 (1998) (noting the severity and scope of water-related disease epidemics);
Atul A. Khasnis & Mary D. Nettleman, Global Warming and Infectious Disease, 36 ARCHIVES MED.
RES. 689 (2005) (noting the potential for increased mortality rates associated with water-related
diseases expanding as a result of climate change).
295 WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2014, at 38 (2014), http://www.who.int/
malaria/publications/world_malaria_report_2014/wmr-2014-no-profiles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F5T8XSBJ].
296 See Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1291–98.
297 Id. at 1276.
298 Id. at 1290.
291
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Figure 1: Venn Diagram of the Three Water Law Agendas 299

I have previously described this diagram as follows:
[I]n Area A of the diagram, all three agendas are integrated. An example of a
water law that integrates all three agendas might include legal incentives for
water efficiency, like . . . minimum water efficiencies for appliances. In that
case, more water is available for the environment to protect aquatic habitat
and to dilute pollution, thus advancing the Green Agenda. More water is
available for [human use], thus advancing the Blue Agenda. And more water
is available for hygiene and sanitation, thus preventing water-washed and
waterborne diseases and advancing the Red Agenda. 300

Unfortunately, water law and policy is frequently implemented in
ways where these agendas conflict or are ignored. For example, a nation
may invest in building dams, reservoirs, and irrigation systems in the name
of advancing the Blue Agenda, but by doing so, it brings disease vector
habitats closer to human communities. 301 Or a nation may prohibit the
discharge of pesticides in rivers and lakes to protect water quality in the
name of the Green Agenda, but that would make it more difficult to
299

Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1298–99.
301 S. Sow et al., Water-Related Disease Patterns Before and After the Construction of the Diama
Dam in Northern Senegal, 96 ANNALS TROPICAL MED. & PARASITOLOGY 575, 579 (2002) (describing
the rise of malaria and schistosomiasis in the wake of the construction of the Diama Dam and related
infrastructure in Senegal).
300
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respond to disease outbreaks because pesticides help to kill disease vectors
like mosquito larvae. 302
As I have written elsewhere, “[t]he . . . water crisis in Flint, Michigan,
can [also] be better understood through this [diagram’s] framework.” 303 To
address water supply issues, “Flint ceased purchasing water from Detroit
and instead shifted its primary water source to the [less costly] Flint
River.”304 This shift to a closer and cheaper water supply is textbook Blue
Agenda thinking, but it resulted in a major public health crisis, including
lead contamination and an outbreak of the waterborne Legionnaires’
Disease.305 Had water planners integrated the Red and Green Agendas into
their analysis, they may have considered the potential for waterborne
pathogen outbreaks and chloride contamination of the river that resulted in
lead leaching from pipes. 306
The fundamental importance of the three-agendas framework is to
encourage an integrated water policy to achieve water security. Integrating
the Red Agenda advances water security by mitigating the costs and risks
associated with water disease epidemics. But current water law fails to
integrate the Red Agenda due to the siloed thinking of water rights and
water quality lawyers, who work in a vacuum and do not frequently interact
or collaborate with public health professionals. 307 Certain legal reforms,
such as requiring Health Impact Assessments (HIAs) in connection with
water resource development projects, could help to better integrate the Red
Agenda into water and policy. 308 An HIA would be similar to the

302 Nat’l Cotton Council v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 940 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that discharge of
pesticides into rivers and lakes required a Clean Water Act permit).
303 Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35 at 1299. Specifically, I argued that “[t]he crisis in Flint
is arguably an example of pure Blue thinking, lodged in Area F . . . and failing to adequately integrate
the other agendas.” Id. at 1300.
304 Id. at 1299.
305 Id.; see also Suzannah Gonzales, Legionnaires’ Spike in Michigan County Dealing with Water
Crisis, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2016, 5:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-michigan-wateridUSKCN0UR23120160113 [https://perma.cc/5KNG-4PUK]).
306 Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1299; see also Stephen Rodrick, Who Poisoned
Flint, Michigan?, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/whopoisoned-flint-michigan-20160122 [https://perma.cc/LZ7R-GAHK]).
307
See Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1311–13; see also Robert L. Glicksman &
Richard E. Levy, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 511–15 (2011) (describing costs
associated with the silo effect in agency rulemaking and adjudication, and the efforts of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs in the U.S. federal government to overcome silo effects).
308 See Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1315–16; see also, e.g., Health Impact
Assessment: Main Concepts and Suggested Approach (European Ctr. for Health Policy, Gothenburg
Consensus
Paper,
1999),
http://www.healthedpartners.org/ceu/hia/hia01/
01_02_gothenburg_paper_on_hia_1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY3F-NYU6] [hereinafter Gothenburg
Consensus] (describing approaches for the effective implementation of health impact assessments).
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Environmental Impact Statements prepared under the National
Environmental Protection Act, under which projects undertaken, permitted,
or funded by the U.S. federal government are required to evaluate
environmental impacts and potential alternatives that could avoid those
impacts.309 The approach of the HIA policy would be similar, under which
legislation, treaties, or the internal rules of international development banks
would require the evaluation of the impacts of a water development project
on disease vector habitat and the possible alternatives to avoid any public
health challenges associated with such water projects.
Some have criticized assessment requirements as “toothless
procedural hoops with little to no [substantive] impact.” 310 This need not be
so, however. These procedural requirements can have substantive
components when agencies and collaborating organizations agree to
enforceable obligations incorporated into the assessment process. 311
Further, requiring assessments can improve project planning through
mandatory consideration of public health concerns that may otherwise be
ignored, and the public release of the assessment report would improve
transparency. 312 These assessments and the potential for associated
substantive requirements would integrate the Red Agenda into water law
and policy and move that policy closer to achieving water security.
C. Encouraging Investment in Water Innovation and Infrastructure
The reforms I have proposed thus far will advance global water
security. However, additional reforms are necessary to encourage greater
investment in the technology and infrastructure. Billions of dollars are
needed globally simply to maintain existing water infrastructure. 313 Leaking
pipes have resulted in wasted water all over the world, without recovery of
309 See, e.g., Gothenburg Consensus, supra note 308 (setting forth recommendations for conducting
health impact assessments and comparing them to environmental impact assessments); Andrew L.
Dannenberg et al., Growing the Field of Health Impact Assessment in the United States: An Agenda for
Research and Practice, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 262 (2006).
310 Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1316 & n.312 (cataloging examples of such
scholarly critiques).
311 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 H ARV. L.
REV. 1131, 1164 (2012) (noting how agreements within the NEPA Record of Decision may impose
substantive requirements on agencies and regulated parties).
312 Larson, Time of Cholera, supra note 35, at 1316; see also Michael LeVine et al., What About
BOEM? The Need to Reform the Regulations Governing Offshore Oil and Gas Planning and Leasing,
31 ALASKA L. REV. 231, 245 n.74 (2014).
313 See, e.g., Sharmila L. Murthy, The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History, Meaning,
and the Controversy Over-Privatization, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 89, 130 (2013) (“For example, over
the next twenty to thirty years, it is estimated that the United States will need to invest $140–250 billion
in water infrastructure.”); Camille Pannu, Drinking Water and Exclusion: A Case Study from
California’s Central Valley, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 223, 268 & n.235 (2012).
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costs.314 Investments and innovations in irrigation technology and more
efficient industrial and domestic appliances and equipment are critical to
improved water conservation. 315 In some parts of the world, conservation
alone will be inadequate, and water augmentation technology, such as
cloud seeding or desalination, may be required. 316 And in many instances,
greater investment in dams is necessary to increase flood and drought
resiliency by capturing flood waters and by increasing storage capacity. 317
1. Shared Benefits
“The concept of shared benefits is derived from welfare economics,
noting that water is a . . . commodity with [variable accessibility and]
multiple possible alternative uses . . . .”318 Under this concept, the most
access to and effective use of water often depends on geography. 319 To
facilitate development of dams, the concept of shared benefits should be
recognized as a binding principle of domestic and international water
law.320 As I have noted previously, though “[e]ach [riparian] jurisdiction
could attempt to capture the full panoply of [potential] water uses , . . . that
would mean inefficient attempts to implement uses [of water in ways] that
may be a poor geographic or economic fit.” 321 Rather than attempt to share
the raw water of the river, jurisdictions should share all of the benefits of
that water use based on their comparative geographic and economic
advantages.
For example, an upstream mountainous jurisdiction should develop
dams and share the benefits of storage, flood control, and hydroelectricity
with a lowland, downstream jurisdiction with greater capacity to grow

314

See Andrew F. Colombo & Bryan W. Karney, Energy and Costs of Leaky Pipes: Toward
Comprehensive Picture, 128 J. WATER RESOURCES PLANNING & MGMT. 441, 441 (2002) (“That leaks
are costly in terms of money and resources is a well-established idea . . . . Leakage is the dominant
component of UFW [unaccounted for water].”).
315 See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the United States: Human
Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 785,
844–45 (2009); Ronald A. Kaiser, Texas Water Marketing in the Next Millennium: A Conceptual and
Legal Analysis, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 181, 194 (1996).
316 See Larson, Augmented Water Law, supra note 227, at 773–78.
317 See Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 957–58.
318
Id. at 957.
319 Id.
320 A. Dan Tarlock & Patricia Wouters, Are Shared Benefits of International Waters an Equitable
Apportionment?, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y, 523, 533 (2007) (citing Claudia W. Sadoff &
David Grey, Beyond the River: The Benefits of Cooperation on International Rivers, 4 WATER POL’Y
389 (2002)).
321 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32 at 957.
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food. The benefits of the food in turn can be shared with its upstream
neighbor.322
The 1961 Columbia River Treaty illustrates how a shared-benefits
regime can be implemented. 323 The treaty allows Canada and the U.S. to
manage the river cooperatively, with Canada developing flood-control
measures and the U.S. providing storage and hydroelectric energy. 324
Shared-benefits governance is not a concept limited only to dam
development because it can be applied in other water infrastructure
contexts. The Arizona Water Banking Authority (AWBA) in the Colorado
River basin uses a shared-benefits approach for groundwater
management.325 “Arizona created the AWBA in 1996 as a means of storing
[part of] Arizona’s unused allocation of Colorado River water” 326 through
artificial groundwater-recharge facilities,327 which Arizona’s geology
permits.328 Arizona expanded its use of the AWBA and now also stores
Colorado River water for Nevada, which pays for the storage. 329 Arizona
thus makes use of its comparative geographic and geologic advantage and
shares the benefits of that use with its coriparian state, thereby monetizing
water efficiency.330 As this example shows, “[b]enefit sharing need not be
limited solely to water quantity.” 331
2. Technology Investments
Additional reforms can facilitate investment in water conservation
technologies. For example, in the western United States, priorappropriation water rights regimes typically include the concept of
forfeiture—a “use it or lose it” rule where a water rights holder forfeits its
water right if it fails to use the water for a period of time. 332 The doctrine of
forfeiture discourages implementation of water-efficient irrigation
technology like center-pivot or drip irrigation. Even if a farmer could get
the same productivity out of less water, the farmer will use the same
322

Id. at 914.
Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia River
Basin, Can.–U.S., Sep. 16, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1555.
324 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 957.
325 Id. at 958.
326 Id.
327 Jon Kyl & Ryan A. Smith, Foreword to the Symposium on Water Law and Policy Conference,
49 ARIZ. L. REV. 209, 213 (2007).
328 Larson, Interstitial Federalism, supra note 32, at 958.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 See, e.g., John C. Peck & Constance Crittenden Owen, Loss of Kansas Water Rights for NonUse, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 801, 802 (1995).
323
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amount of water to avoid forfeiture. 333 States could implement water
escrows, where water users could place unused water rights achieved
through conservation into trust with the state. 334 While held in trust, those
rights would be shielded from forfeiture. 335 The trust could then act as a
clearinghouse for the sale of water rights achieved through conservation
and connect potential sellers with potential buyers.336 In some instances,
where financing is needed to implement water conservation technology,
lenders could make loans secured by the rights to the conserved water. This
would allow farmers and developers to access credit needed to invest in
water conservation technologies, and for financiers to encourage the use of
the most advanced and efficient water appliances and irrigation methods.
Other reforms can facilitate the necessary investment in water
augmentation technology. 337 Water law in the western United States, for
example, distinguishes between developed water and salvaged water. 338
Developed water—such as desalinated sea water or bulk water imports—is
imported into the basin by tanker or pipeline. 339 Salvaged water is part of
the basin but made accessible by technological means, such as drilling for
and desalinating otherwise inaccessible and brackish groundwater or
removing invasive scrub brush for forests to increase stream flow. 340
Developed water lies outside the scope of the state’s water rights regime
and is owned by the developing party. 341 In contrast, salvaged water
remains part of the water rights regime, with the salvaging party having no
right to the augmented water created. 342 In the water escrow example from
above, a portion of the water moving through the escrow could be held
back from each transaction to build up a fund of available water rights. 343

333 See Dan Tarlock, How Well Can Water Law Adapt to the Potential Stresses of Global Climate
Change?, 14 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 24 (2010).
334 Rhett Larson & Kelly Kennedy, Bankrupt Rivers, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1335, 1378 (2016).
335 Id.
336
Id.
337 See Rhett B. Larson, Innovation and International Commons: The Case of Desalination Under
International Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 759, 764–67 (2012); Larson, Augmented Water Law, supra note
227, at 767 (discussing examples of the opportunities and obstacles associated with investment in water
augmentation technologies).
338 Larson, Augmented Water Law, supra note 227, at 766–67.
339 Id. at 766.
340
Id.
341 Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 1324–25 (Colo.
1974) (holding that a party that invested in the removal of invasive species along a river—resulting in
increased stream flow—did not secure any special right to that increased water supply because such
waters are salvaged and not developed).
342 Id.
343 Larson & Kennedy, supra note 334, at 1379.
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These water rights could create a discounted source of water rights
available to those who invest in salvaged water technologies or processes,
such as desalination, forestry management practices, or arguably even
cloud seeding. 344 Access to discounted water rights markets would create
incentives that do not currently exist in water law for parties to invest in
water augmentation, at least in the context of salvaged water.345
IV. THE PROMISE AND CHALLENGES OF THE WATER SECURITY PARADIGM
Two related ideas lie at the very heart of a water security paradigm
and are illustrated in a statement made by Bruce Lee regarding his theory
of martial arts: “Be formless, shapeless, like water. You put water into a
cup, it becomes the cup. You put water into a bottle, it becomes the bottle.
Water can flow or it can crash. Be water, my friend.” 346
The two ideas contained in Lee’s theory of martial arts represent the
core related ideas of water security jurisprudence. First, adaptive capacity
is essential in laws and policies formulated under the water security
paradigm. Water laws must be like water: they must be effectively adapted
to respond to changing circumstances. 347 Second, natural resource laws and
policies must no longer seek to manage a “normal” natural system; instead
they must recognize that these systems both flow and crash—they are
creative and destructive. This is perhaps the most important contribution of
the climate change paradigm—that there is no “normal” in natural
resources. This must inform the water security paradigm. Natural resource
policies should depend upon data, models, and assumptions regarding
water extremes like droughts, floods, epidemics, and water conflicts. 348
Laws and policies should seek to manage those extremes rather than seek
to achieve some illusion of the “normal” status of water quality and
quantity. The natural world changes, new technologies evolve, populations
grow, and consumption patterns alter according to economic conditions.
Laws must be able to adapt to manage the extreme conditions brought on
by these dynamic systems.
Laws must, therefore, integrate an “adaptive management” approach.
Adaptive management is “a systematic process for continually improving
management policies and practices by learning from the outcomes of
344

Id. at 1378.
Id.
346 BRUCE LEE, WORDS FROM A MASTER (John R. Little ed., 1999).
347 For a general discussion of adaptive management in natural resource law, see J.B. Ruhl &
Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424 (2010).
348 For a general discussion on management of extremes and avoiding assumptions about the
stationarity of natural systems, see Craig, supra note 82.
345
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implemented management strategies.” 349 Because the ability to predict
future events is inherently limited, legal institutions must periodically
evaluate management decisions and adapt to respond to new information or
changing circumstances or else develop a system that automatically
responds to changing conditions. Water rights regimes should thus allocate
rights based on a percentage of available stream flow rather than a raw
quantity of water. 350 Such a regime automatically adapts to available
resources and avoids the conflicts associated with rigid raw water
allocations.
The advantages of an adaptive approach can be seen by comparing the
approaches of the upper basin states of the Colorado River basin (which
allocate water based on percentage of available flows) and those of the
lower basin states (which allocate based on raw water amounts). 351 The
lower basin states—Arizona, Nevada, and California—deal with this
perpetual problem because the allocations established by law have a builtin structural deficit. 352 The Colorado River Compact allocates 7.5 million
acre-feet per year to the upper basin states and 7.5 million acre-feet per
year to the lower basin states. 353 The 1944 Rivers Treaty with Mexico
allocated 1.5 million acre-feet per year to Mexico. 354 And the system loses
1.5 million acre-feet each year to evapotranspiration. That adds up to an
assumed 18 million acre-feet available in the river system each year. But
tree ring analysis demonstrates that the river more typically contains
around 13.5 million acre-feet per year.355 The upper basin allocates its 7.5
million acre-feet based on a percentage of available stream flow, thereby

349 Claudia Paul-Wostl, Transitions Towards Adaptive Management of Water Facing Climate and
Global Change, 21 WATER RESOURCES MGMT. 49, 51 (2007). “Adaptive management [is a decision
process that] promotes flexible decisionmaking that can be adjusted in the face of uncertainties as
outcomes from management actions and other events become better understood . . . . It is not a ‘trial and
error’ process, but rather emphasizes learning while doing.” BRYON K WILLIAMS ET AL., ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT
4
(2009),
https://www2.usgs.gov/sdc/doc/DOI%20Adaptive%20ManagementTechGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EST-GL6E].
350 See, e.g., Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Out-of-Priority Water Use: Adding Flexibility to the Water
Appropriation System, 83 NEB. L. REV. 485, 522 (2004).
351 See Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado River Compact Entitlements, Clearing Up Misconceptions,
28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 83, 85–87 (2008) (describing the history of the law of the
Colorado River, including the different approaches taken by the Upper Basin, relying on percentage of
streamflow to allocate water, and the Lower Basin, relying on raw water allocations).
352
Neillie Fields, The Colorado River System: Perspectives from the Lower Basin, 19 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 333, 335 (2016).
353 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 632 (1963); 70 CONG. REC. 325 (1928).
354 Treaty Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande, art. 10, Mex.–U.S., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219.
355 Eric L. Garner & Michelle Ouellette, Future Shock? The Law of the Colorado River in the
Twenty-First Century, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 469, 472 (1995).
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accounting automatically for the structural deficit and adapting to the everchanging conditions of the river. 356 The lower basin, on the other hand,
allocates raw water amounts to each state and is in a perpetual state of
negotiation over how to respond to the shortage. This rigid system cannot
survive as an effective means of water allocation in a dynamic world. 357
Water security requires adaption to water reality and resilience to water
extremes.
Adaptive management has become a central feature of climate change
policy debates,358 as policymakers must respond to changing climatic
conditions and ever-improving climate modeling. 359 The question of
sustainable development encompasses not just maintaining and improving
human life but also maintaining and improving human life under changing
environmental and technological conditions. As such, natural resource law
needs to “do development differently” through adaptive management.360
However, technology and consumption patterns change even more rapidly
than the climate, and thus adaptive management must play an even more
critical role in environmental and natural resource law under the water
security paradigm.
Adaptive capacity in water security is important in part because no
paradigm in any policy field is perfect, and the water security paradigm is
no exception.361 Other previous natural resource paradigms should
influence its development. The climate change paradigm’s emphasis on
renewable energy will reduce water consumption, the green paradigm’s
356

See Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of Permanence
Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 118 (2003) (discussing the difficulties
inherent in inflexible raw water allocations in the lower basin of the Colorado River).
357 See id. at 120.
358 See, e.g., Craig, supra note 82.
359 The developmental question is no longer limited to “what can be done to advance humanity?”
but rather now encompasses “how can we maintain and ensure human lives under changing
environmental conditions?” This is true in both the developed and developing world, but is an
especially harsh reality for peoples and nations who lack the resources and abilities to formulate
appropriate adaptive strategies. Gabriel Eckstein, Water Scarcity, Conflict, and Security in a Climate
Change World: Challenges and Opportunities for International Law and Policy, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J.
409, 456 (2009). This requires governments to incorporate strategies into all their development
activities that facilitate adaptation.
360
Id. at 457 (citing UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME (UNDP), UNDP’S STRATEGY FOR
ADAPTATION
TO
CLIMATE
CHANGE
1,
https://www.undp-aap.org/sites/undp-aap.org/
files/UNDP_Adaptation_Strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7F8-FTXX]) (using the “do development
differently” language)).
361 See, e.g., Robert Alexy, Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Legal Discourse, 17 CARDOZO L. REV.
1027, 1032 (1996); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, Punishment, and the Psychology of SelfControl, 61 EMORY L.J. 501, 553 (2012); Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 696
(2013) (all illustrating that all policy paradigms have limitations, and noting criticisms of dominant
paradigms in criminal law, the philosophy of law, and investment law and policy).

196

112:139 (2017)

Water Security

emphasis on pollution prevention and remediation will help integrate the
Red and Green Agendas with the Blue Agenda, and the industrial paradigm
will promote market-based incentives to encourage investment in water
infrastructure. Where the water security paradigm is insufficient, previous
or new paradigms can and should supplement the new dominant paradigm
where necessary. In some instances, a national or supranational approach to
policy leadership will be necessary because some water issues require
governance that extends beyond the basin, including virtual water,
desalination, and cloud seeding. 362 Nevertheless, just as the industrial
paradigm gave way to the green paradigm and the green paradigm then
receded in influence as the climate change paradigm rose to prominence, so
should we deemphasize climate change in order to promote a more
resonant and integrated water security approach.
Some supporters of the current climate change paradigm may argue
that we lose too much with a shift to water security. For example, some
may argue that momentum toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions will
be lost if we shift our focus to water footprints rather than carbon
footprints. However, renewable energies are typically more water efficient
than nonrenewable sources, and fossil fuel combustion energy sources
depend on enormous amounts of water.363 Thus, a reduction in water
footprints will result in a reduction in carbon footprints. 364 Furthermore, the
water footprint framework will also account for water consumed in
deforestation, thus accounting not only for increased carbon emissions but
also the loss of carbon sinks. 365
Given the potential for water conflict, some climate change supporters
could also point out that water can prove divisive. 366 While it is true that
water scarcity can result in disputes and even conflict, water is just as
frequently a source of cooperation and often has a unifying effect. 367
Furthermore, while water security has the potential to focus policy aims on
a contentious resource in some cases, climate change can hardly be pointed

362

Rhett B. Larson, Inter-State Water Law in the United States of America: What Lessons for
International Water Law?, 2 BRILL RES. PERSP. INT’L WATER L. 1, 18 (2017) (noting that governance
regimes in water law and policy may sometimes require jurisdiction that is broader than the river basin
in instances where water policy has interbasin implications, as in the case of desalination or cloud
seeding).
363 Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1640 (2015).
364 Jeff B. Kray, Climate Change and Water Resources, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 4A.01(b) (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley eds., 3d ed. 2010).
365 Larson, Reconciling Energy, supra note 13, at 954.
366 See, e.g., George William Sherk, The Management of Interstate Water Conflicts in the TwentyFirst Century: Is it Time to Call Uncle?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 764 (2005).
367 Larson, Holy Water, supra note 234, at 109.
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to as an example of a nondivisive, unifying, conflict-free policy
paradigm.368
Still, there are other criticisms of the water security paradigm, and it
will require further research either to integrate these concerns fully or to
accommodate them in better, alternative paradigms in the future. For
example, the water security paradigm could be implemented in ways that
overemphasize the Blue Agenda, encouraging water uses that are either
unsustainable or that impact aquatic or riparian habitats. The water security
paradigm’s anthropocentric focus should not be so narrow as to exclude
necessary considerations of biodiversity. Additionally, careful
consideration should be given to how the water security paradigm best
addresses issues of salt water. It has obvious implications for desalination
as a source of drinking water. But if the water security paradigm is viewed
too narrowly, it will not integrate important issues of displacement
associated with sea level rise or ocean acidification. 369
Ultimately, rising sea levels present a real threat of water insecurity
that should be integrated within the water security paradigm because water
security should include flood resilience as well as protection of freshwater
aquifers from saline intrusion. The water security paradigm’s approach to
ocean acidification is somewhat attenuated—improved water efficiency
and lowered global water footprints will cause reduced carbon emissions,
which should mitigate some issues of ocean acidification. But there is no
question that the water security paradigm has its limits. This Article is not
arguing for a perfect paradigm—simply a better one that will also need to
be supplemented by complementary policies to address problems it fails to
integrate.
Finally, perhaps the most significant criticism of the water security
paradigm that will require additional research questions the degree to
which water is more successful at spurring collective action to address
sustainability challenges. As is evident in the climate change paradigm,
behavioral psychology will be instructive here. 370 Empirical research is
necessary to compare how people respond to advocacy based on the
368 See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation Through the Lens
of a Hypothetical Lawsuit, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 701 (2008); Anna Spain, Beyond Adjudication:
Resolving International Resource Disputes in an Era of Climate Change, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 343
(2011).
369 See generally Sumudu Atapattu, Climate Change, Human Rights, and Forced Migration:
Implications for International Law, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 607 (2009) (analyzing legal issues surrounding
displacement associated with sea level rise); Robin Kundis Craig, Dealing with Ocean Acidification:
The Problem, the Clean Water Act, and State and Regional Approaches, 6 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
387 (2016) (analyzing legal challenges associated with ocean acidification).
370 See supra notes 229–46 and accompanying text.
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climate change paradigm as compared to advocacy based on the water
security paradigm. Perhaps behavioral psychology issues such as
compassion fatigue or optimism bias would prevent effective transmission
of the water security approach. 371 But even these questions will necessarily
be impacted by typical concerns of bounded rationality, including the
availability heuristic and recency bias, 372 so that people in places prone to
water-related disasters may respond better to a water security approach,
while those in coastal areas or living near poles or glaciers respond better to
a discourse based on climate change.
Despite this need for careful tailoring and continued research, the
water security paradigm represents a better approach to understanding and
communicating natural resource policy. It speaks directly in terms of water,
rather than indirectly in terms of carbon, and it addresses issues of
population growth and economic development while sacrificing little of the
important focus of climate change on weather variability. And at its core,
the water security paradigm is about resilience of human communities to
water variability and its implications.
CONCLUSION
The shift from climate change to water security is fundamentally
about how the world should talk about sustainability challenges. Water is
not part of the climate change problem. Rather, climate change is a
component of the water problem. Scholarship and policy papers in natural
resource management should not have to answer questions like, “What
does this have to do with climate change?” Rather, scholarship and
advocacy in natural resource and environmental law and policy should seek
to answer the question, “What does this have to do with water security?”
This shift in dialogue is perhaps all the more important with the new Trump
administration’s hostility to climate change-framed policy discussions. 373
371 For a description and analysis of compassion fatigue—the decrease in individual or public
support of initiatives to alleviate human suffering due to stagnation of progress on the issue and a sense
of hopelessness in finding a solution—see generally Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue and the
First Amendment: Are the Homeless Constitutional Castaways?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255 (1994).
Optimism bias is the “tendency of individuals to believe that they are less likely to experience negative
events . . . than the average person, and more likely to experience positive events.” Tom Baker & Peter
Siegelman, Tontines for the Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks into the Health-Insurance Pool with an
Idea from Insurance History and Behavioral Economics, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 79, 95.
372 See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial
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The old climate change paradigm could now be politicized into silence. To
avoid this and engage those who, for whatever reason, refuge to engage in
the climate change conversation, the dialogue must change.
But the water security paradigm is not only a matter of changing the
dialogue surrounding sustainability. The legal reforms proposed in this
Article will reorient our focus toward water-related disasters and waterrelated economic impacts, such as food prices, which represent the threats
of climate change most accessible and relevant to the general public.
People naturally care most about the implications of climate change for
themselves, their families, and their communities. And these implications
revolve around water security. Ultimately, the only reason this blue planet
matters so much is because it is blue. Our policy paradigm, therefore,
should focus on what matters and resonates most. The sooner scientists and
policymakers accept that reality and refocus efforts around something
everyone can understand—water security—the sooner we will start
effectively addressing our looming global sustainability crisis. Until we
stop talking about climate change and instead concentrate on water
security, we are just blowing hot air. And once we reframe our discussions
about sustainability around water security, we will finally be talking about
the actual problem and its primary solution. Our laws and our policies will
“be water”—adaptable to a dynamic natural world and aimed at mitigating,
or being resilient to, extreme water conditions.
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